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ABSTRACT
Many disciplines in everyday life depend on improved performance in conditional
probability problems. Most adults struggle with conditional probability problems and several
prior studies have shown participant accuracy is less than 50%. This study examined user
performance when aided with computer-generated Venn and Euler type diagrams in a nonlearning context. Despite the prevalence of research into diagrams and extensive research into
conditional probability problem solving, this study is one of the only studies to apply theories
of working memory to predict user performance in conditional probability problems with
diagrams. Following relational complexity theory, this study manipulated problem
complexity in computer generated diagrams and text-only displays to improve user
performance and perceptions of satisfaction. Partially consistent with the study hypotheses,
complex visuals outperformed complex text-only displays and simple text-only displays
outperformed complex text-only displays. However, a significant interaction between users’
spatial ability and the use of diagram displays led to a degradation of low-spatial user
performance in the diagram displays when compared to high spatial users. Participants with
less spatial ability were significantly impaired in their ability to solve conditional probability
problems when aided by a diagram.
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CHAPTER 1. RESEARCH PROBLEMS, OBJECTIVES AND
SIGNIFICANCE
With the explosion of availability of information in the past few decades, people are
inundated with numbers. News coverage about health, security and safety risks often require
people understand quantitative problems and make sound inferences. Understanding the
chances of contracting diseases, weighing the pros and cons on the risks of driving or flying
or understanding election results requires good probability and quantitative reasoning skills.
Researchers are finding many people lack these skills and make erroneous judgments.
With a greater reliance on web and mobile interactions for complex quantitative data,
human computer interface (HCI) designers will need to pay particular attention to how
information displays may or may not help. While the use of visuals is generally thought to
help in problem solving, some common quantitative problems seem to defy reliable
improvement with visuals. Problems which require people to process multiple relationships
between terms and incorporate math within their reasoning are especially prone to error.
Probability and statistical reasoning problems are a prime example of these kinds of
problems. Prior research that tries to explain why people err and how to make improvements
in visual displays are conflicting (Brase, 2008; Evans, Handley, Perham, Over & Thompson,
2000; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto. & Legrenzi, 1999; Mellers &
McGraw, 1999; Stenning & Oberlander, 1995; Sloman, Over, Slovak & Stibel, 2003). In some

cases, a visual representation seems to help performance, in other cases it hurts.
Many disciplines in everyday life depend on improved performance in statistical and
probability reasoning problems. In tasks such as disease diagnosis, interpretation of evidence
in criminal trials and management of security and risk data, people need to process statistical
and probability data, relying on syllogistic, conditional reasoning and math skills, to make
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critical inferences and decisions. Computer-aided displays are now nearly ubiquitous in
today’s work and home environments. For HCI designers, understanding what factors
improve performance is important.
According to theories of working memory (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986;
Baddeley, 2007; Miyake & Shah, 1999) and mental models research (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999;
Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff & Sloutsky, 2006; Knauf, Jola & Strube, 2001; Ruff, Knauff,

Fangmeier, Spreer,, 2003; Vandierendonck & De Vooght, 1997), visual displays should aid in
these tasks as they can make better use of working memory, reduce cognitive load and
facilitate mental model construction, thus generating better judgments. The conditional
probability problem is a common and difficult quantitative reasoning task. While it can be
solved using a complex formula (developed by Thomas Bayes in 1764), most people have not
learned Bayes’ theorem. Solving the problem requires people to build a mental model of
relationships between elements in the problem. Individuals’ working memory can be
overloaded. While a significant amount of research has examined why people make errors in
conditional probability reasoning problems (Eddy, 1982; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995;
Sloman, et al., 2003), very little of it has looked systematically at optimizing people’s

performance using visuals. Moreover, practically no research has applied theories of working
memory to guide facilitation of these kinds of problems. Individuals do vary in their working
memory capacities and understanding the limits of working memory capacity may matter
when constructing visuals.
Solving these kinds of problems requires all aspects of working memory, including
attentional control, linguistic and visual (object and spatial) processing. Visual displays can
engage both automatic perceptual and more effortful cognitive mechanisms as people process
the external representation (display) and construct a mental model that depicts the problem
state. It is quite possible that individuals cannot effectively process a visual and solve the
- 11 -

problem at the same time, especially if processing the visual representation competes for
limited working memory resources. Some diagrams commonly thought to help statistical
reasoning problems that are widely used include Venn and Euler diagrams.
Counter-intuitively, some research is finding that Venn and Euler type diagrams,
which try to depict set inclusions and conditional relationships directly, may actually hurt
performance (Brase, 2008; Calvillo, DeLeeuw & Revlin, 2006; Sloman et al., 2003). Mental
models theory (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999), relational complexity theory (Halford, Wilson &
Phillips, 1998), and explanations of working memory limits (Cowan, 2000; Cowen et al., 2005;
Rouder et al., 2008) can provide guidance for designing visuals to help people solve these

problems. Despite the preponderance of research in each of these domains and into the
problems with performance in statistical reasoning, surprisingly little has been brought to
bear on improving performance in statistical reasoning problems with visuals in non-learning
conditions.
By applying theories of working memory, mental model theory and relational
complexity theory this study examines how designers can construct visuals to help in these
kinds of problems. This study’s objective is to more precisely identify how Venn and Euler
type diagrams can be constructed to help performance on these problems. This study will
examine how manipulations of the problem complexity (as described by the number of
relations or entities that must simultaneously be kept in the focus of attention) and using
visuals in place of text where possible can improve performance. As research into relational
complexity and limitations of working memory indicate, when problems are presented in
such a way as to keep the number of simultaneously interacting elements in working memory
well within the limit of about four items, people’s performance should improve. Prior
research may have overlooked the significance of this critical working memory limit in
solving these kinds of problems. Additionally, when displays selectively use visuals in place
- 12 -

of text, demands on the attentional capacity that has to coordinate text processing, visual
processing and mental model construction are reduced and modality-specific forms of short
term memory capacity might be better leveraged, which in turn should contribute to improved
performance for the individual.
Because the potential relationships between elements in the visual display are not
clear and can easily exceed three or four items that must be held in memory simultaneously,
these problems most likely lie at and beyond the edge of working memory capacity. Perhaps
some of the conflict and poor performance in prior research may be because displays used in
those studies contain too many elements or relationships between elements and do not
carefully help the user manage limited working memory resources by leveraging perceptual
processes to guide attention and sequence the construction of the mental model. Also, by
recruiting younger participants from universities, many prior studies may have overlooked
the marked decrease in spatial processing abilities (which are a critical working memory
component implied in reasoning skills) that naturally occurs between the people between the
ages of 20 and 45 (Hale, Myerson, Emery, Lawrence & Dufault, 2008). Everyday situations of
problem comprehension involve people of varying working memory capacities.
For visual interface designers, this study will identify clearer design guidelines that, if
followed, may help users make better judgments in critical conditional probability and other
similar quantitative reasoning problems. This study intends to provide a theoretical
explanation and validate that using visuals that carefully control relational complexity and
conserve working memory will help people understand the problem.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature into the role of visuals in reasoning problems is diverse and involves
many disciplines. While some limited research within the human-computer interaction (HCI)
and computer science disciplines does exist, a large body of prior research exists in cognitive
psychology, neuropsychology, economics, and learning and instruction research.
This study starts by examining statistical reasoning problems (specifically conditional
probability problems), discusses the causes and suggested cures for poor performance, shows
how statistical reasoning relates to other forms of reasoning and how neurological evidence
may be converging on explanations for performance. Finally, this review of the literature
examines three theories that interrelate and are relevant for this study: theories of working
memory, relational complexity theory and cognitive load theory.

PERFORMANCE OF CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY PROBLEMS
With the vast amount of complex information around us, statistical reasoning skills
are critical for both the layman and the professional. The medical, social science, economics,
legal and risk management disciplines use statistical problem solving in contexts that require
many people who are unskilled in statistics and probabilities to make critical judgments and
decisions. Everyday contexts include healthcare professional communicating disease
diagnosis and treatment, lawyers, jurors and court officials’ interpretation of evidence in
criminal and civil cases, business professionals’ decision-making regarding risks and
probabilities of future events (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Kurzenhauser & Hertwig, 2006;
Boumans, 2008; Kahnamen & Lovallo, 1993; Sedlmeier, 2000). More and more, the news
media, blogs and social media disseminate poll data, social science surveys and many
scientific studies requiring people to have statistical literacy.
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Many people seem to lack good statistical reasoning skills creating a current context
that some have termed “innumeracy” which refers to peoples’ inability to reason with
numbers and mathematical concepts (Paulos, 1988). Several studies show participants’
accuracy on conditional probability problems is low to intermediate, ranging from 6% of the
problems correct to 62% depending on the textual format (Brase, Cosmides, Tooby, 1998;
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).

Different verbal formats for conditional probability problems
An example of a conditional probability problem, shown below, has been used in
several studies (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995):
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for women at age forty who participate
in routine screening. If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will
get a positive mammography. If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability
is 9.6% that she will also get a positive mammography. A woman in this age group
had a positive mammography in a routine screening. What is the probability that she
actually has breast cancer?
The normative answer requires applying a form of Bayes’ theorem to calculate the
posterior probability that a woman with positive results has cancer. The symbols H and –H
denote the two hypotheses (cancer and no cancer, respectively) and D denotes the data
representing the positive test results. The formula for computing p(H | D) is as follows.

p( H | D) =

p( H ) p( D | H )
(.01)(.80)
= = .078
p ( H ) p ( D | H ) + p (− H ) p ( D | − H ) (.01)(.80) + (.99)(.096)

The method for calculating conditional probabilities was developed by Thomas Bayes
in 1764. Only those who have studied Bayes’ theorem well would have knowledge of how to
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apply it to these kinds of problems. Prior studies show that even physicians estimate
probabilities incorrectly when presented in text form. Eddy (1982) shows that 95% of the
physicians queried estimated the probability of p(H | D) in this problem between 70-80% not
7.8%. Other prior research indicates subject accuracy is typically poor for this text-only,
probability representation of the problem (Gigerenzer & Edwards, 2003; Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage, 1995; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Kurzenhauser & Hoffrage, 2002; Sedlmeier,
2000; Sloman, et al., 2003).
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) have argued that expressing conditional probability
problems as natural frequencies rather than as probabilities improves subjects’ performance.
Natural frequencies arise from natural sampling and are not normalized with respect to base
rates (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1999). Rather, natural sampling mimics the process of
encountering instances in a population sequentially – in other words, as human beings
normally encounter observations in their lives. Cosmides and Tooby (1996) and Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage (1995) propose that human evolution has endowed us with minds that can reason
with natural frequencies better than probabilities. Therefore participants should perform
better when probability problems are expressed as natural frequencies.
A natural frequency version of a conditional probability problem, following
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995), is as follows:
10 out of every 1,000 woman at age forty who participate in routine screening
have breast cancer. 8 out of every 10 women with breast cancer will also get a
positive mammography. 95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also
get a positive mammography. Here is a new representative sample of 100 women at
age forty who got a positive mammography in a routine screening. How many of
these women do you expect to actually have breast cancer?
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Natural frequencies can also be depicted in a contingency table, shown below.
H
8
2
10

D
Not D

Not H
95
103
895
897
990 1000

While natural frequencies make clearer the problem’s hidden set structure, so do other
problem formats, which can depict the quantitative information as probabilities rather than
frequencies (Evans, et al., 2000; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Johnson-Laird et al., 1999;
Mellers & McGraw, 1999). Displays that clarify the problem’s set structure help people solve
these problems. This particular problem’s nested set structure includes a) women who are
regularly screened, b) women who test positive for the disease and c) women who have the
disease.
In addition, a natural frequency representation has a simpler mathematical form of
Bayes’ theorem:

| D)
p ( H=

d &h
8
= = 0.078
d & h + d & −h 8 + 95

This format has fewer elements and fewer computations needed to calculate an answer.

Conditional probability reasoning and other forms of reasoning
Conditional probability problems share similarities with syllogistic, conditional and
relational reasoning problems, all of which have been extensively researched. To solve
conditional probability problems, people have to determine what are the relevant categories
or sets and determine how these sets relate to each other. For example, the following is a
syllogistic problem:
Is the following argument valid?
All F are H
All H are D
- 17 -

Some F are not D
These problems can be easily depicted as an Euler diagram:

F

H

D

In this case, the set-subset structure between the elements F, H and D, are depicted
clearly in the diagram. Conditional probability problems are frequently represented in Euler
diagrams for the same purpose: to visually depict the relationships between the sets
represented in the text of the problem.
Conditional reasoning (which is related, but distinct from solving conditional
probability problems) involves drawing inferences from problems in which the occurrence of
an event depends on the occurrence of another event. An example is “If the flashlight runs out
of battery, then it won’t shine.” In a similar fashion, conditional probability (statistical
reasoning) problems require people to infer a probability of one event that depends on the
probability of a prior event, e.g., if the person tests positive for a disease, they may actually
have the disease.
Relational reasoning problems require people to draw inferences based on relations
between items:
A is bigger than B
B is smaller than C
A is smaller than C
D is smaller than B
Is A smaller than D?
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Relational reasoning is needed to determine the sequence of items in an array and is
brought to bear to resolve relationships based on size, width, weight, importance, position or
any relational property. Conditional probability problems involve relational reasoning if the
problem solver links numeracy to the set inclusion, e.g., the population of those with the
disease is smaller than the population of those who tested positive for the disease, which in
turn, is smaller than the population of all those tested for the disease. Conditional probability
problems involve more than just syllogistic reasoning. People need to comprehend and
integrate set size and mathematical operations based on the set relationships. In this regard,
“thinking about numbers” may be interacting with “thinking about sets” to create additional
complexity beyond syllogistic reasoning.

USE OF VISUALS IN CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY PROBLEM SOLVING
While ample research over the past few decades has examined the errors people make
in performing statistical reasoning, a lesser but growing body of research has addressed how
to teach people to solve statistical problems (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1999; Kurzenhauser &
Hoffrage, 2002; Sedlemeier, 2000). Unfortunately, many everyday settings that require

statistical reasoning abilities involve people who haven’t been taught how to reason with
statistics or have failed to retain the associated skills. Everyday settings are also not normally
conducive for teaching numeracy and statistical reasoning skills and may require visuals to
help (Nelson, Reyna, Fagerlin, Lipkus, Peters, 2008).
Intuitively, one would think that using diagrams to depict clearly the set structure of
the problem would help performance. Diagrams are often employed to facilitate thinking
processes in problems that are too complex to be solved exclusively with internal cognition
(Larkin & Simon, 1987; Hoffman, 2007). Diagrams can be considered an analogical
representation with a structure that models the semantics of the problem (Kulpa, 1994).
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One common diagram, an Euler diagram, failed to provide significant improvement in
either a probability or frequency format (Sloman et al., 2003) and performed worse than
iconic displays (Brase, 2008) which depict each item in the frequency of observations as an
icon. According to Brase (2008), iconic displays are superior to Venn diagrams because they
better approximate ‘actual ecological presentations.’ In other words, in the ecological
rationality approach he advocates, iconic displays are similar to natural frequency formats.
These iconic representations more closely resemble naturalistic settings in which people
encounter events or cases as a sequence of occurrences over time.
Doctors’ comprehension of statistical information can be improved with this natural
sampling approach (Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, Martignon, 2002). In a study examining
deductive reasoning, Calvillo, DeLeeuw and Revlin (2006) found a similar disadvantage for
Euler diagrams, which performed worse than similar text-only representations. Despite their
advantage, iconic displays still only generated correct answers less than 50% of the time in
Brase’s (2008) study. To further improve performance, HCI designers may need to consider
more than choosing an iconic or spatial display.

Problems with Venn and Euler diagrams
Why some prior research would find that Euler type diagrams would be at a
disadvantage (Sloman et al., 2003; Brase, 2008) is initially puzzling. Euler diagrams are
thought to be equivalent to the notations or partial models people are hypothesized to use by
mental models theory (Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). Euler diagrams’ specificity ought to
compel people to generate the appropriate internal representation (mental model) depicted in
the visual. These diagrams may be failing to control people’s attention, which is one way
diagrams can help (Larkin & Simon, 1987). These diagrams may also be failing to limit the
number of interacting elements that must be comprehended simultaneously and may be
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exceeding working memory. Venn and Euler diagram processing may be similar to
understanding visual animations (such as an animated sequence of pulleys) in which
performance degrades as more items are needed to be held in spatial working memory
(Hegarty, 2000). Conditional probability problems also involve math computation. Math
problems do involve the visuospatial scratchpad (Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003; Zago &
Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2002; Houdé, & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003). Performing the mental
calculations required to solve these problems could be adding additional spatial working
memory load, thus increasing the complexity of the problem.

RELEVANT COGNITIVE THEORIES
Several cognitive models are relevant for this study, including theories of working
memory, dual-coding theory, mental models, working memory capacity, graph
comprehension theory, relational complexity and cognitive load. This study examines the
relevancy for each of these theories and identifies relational complexity theory and cognitive
load theory as critical theoretical frameworks that can guide visual construction.

Baddeley and Hitch’s model of working memory
The model of working memory introduced by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) has become
a dominant and well-researched model used in cognitive psychology, multimedia display and
in some human-computer interaction (HCI) research. Working memory is normally defined
as the involving dynamic and temporary storage and processing of information during the
performance of complex cognitive activities (Miyake & Shah, 1999). Baddeley’s (1986)
model contains two subsystems: one for verbal information (the phonological loop, or verbal
working memory) and one for visuospatial information (the visuospatial sketchpad, or
visuospatial working memory).
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The phonological loop (PL) maintains verbal information heard or read which decays
in a few seconds unless maintained by a process known as articulatory rehearsal (Baddeley,
2003). The visuospatial sketchpad (VSSP) maintains visual information (object properties)
and spatial information (or location/movement). Thus, the VSSP most likely contains two
disassociated subsystems: a visual component, for processing object shape, color, texture and
a spatial component for processing location, and motion (Klauer & Zhao, 2004). A third
system, the central executive (CE), focuses the limited capacity in working memory and
provides the capacity to switch or split attention across tasks (Baddeley, 2007). The three
model system is depicted here:

Visouspatial
sketchpad

Central
executive

Phonological
loop

Dual-coding theory
Most people, even trained physicians (Nelson et al., 2008), have problems with
statistical reasoning indicating that they cannot retrieve a previously learned strategy
(schema) from long term memory and apply it. Since few people have mastered Bayes’
theorem, for most people, statistical reasoning and conditional probability problems appear to
be novel problems. Dual-coding theory (Paivio, 1991, 1986) would predict that visuals can
facilitate performance by aiding in retrieval of a schema from long term memory through
referential encoding. According to dual-coding theory, schemas can be encoded in long-term
both verbally and visually. A visual would provide an alternate means of retrieving from
long-term memory the memorized schema for solving the conditional probability problem.
Since this problem is most likely novel and people do not have access to a relevant
schema in long term memory, visuals, at least one designed with the intent of triggering
- 22 -

references to schemas in long term memory, may not facilitate performance. Manipulations of
the problem that include additional visual information (expressed verbally) may increase
spurious referential processing. This could affect performance negatively (Knauff & May,
2006; Knauff & Johnson-Laird, 2002). Also, visual manipulations which bring irrelevant
visual details to problem can impede performance, especially for low-working memory
people who spend more time processing the irrelevant visual information than high working
memory people (Sanchez & Wiley, 2006).

Mental models
Both behavioral and neuropsychological mental models theory research (Johnson,
Laird et al., 1999; Ruff et al., 2003; Fangmeier, Knauff, Ruff & Sloutsky, 2006) shows that
people reason in these problems not by following linguistic rules, but by means of
visuospatial models of the problem structure. While verbal processing and the phonological
loop would need to be employed to process the text of these problems and for certain math
operations (Trbovivh & LeFevre, 2003), solving the problems requires manipulation of the
premises and relations within the problem using visuospatial processing and central executive
cognitive resources.
Dual task studies, which require participants to solve reasoning problems while
simultaneously executing tasks that engage one of the components of working memory, help
reveal which components of working memory are involved in a given task. Several dual task
studies show that the VSSP and CE are involved in problem solving, consistent with mental
models theory (Klauer, Stegmaier & Meiser, 1997; Knauf, Jola & Strube, 2001;
Vandierendonck & De Vooght, 1997). Mental models need not be visual, and can represent
non-spatial relationships, such as kinship, or non-visual precepts in deductive reasoning.
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According to Ruff et al. (2003), model based reasoning interferes with other spatial tasks, not
necessarily with concurrent visual tasks without a spatial component.
The Ruff et al. (2003) study is worth noting in that this study combines neurological
data (data based on imaging of the human brain) with behavioral data (data based on users
performance on a task). It found that reasoning was positively correlated with visuospatial
tests (Block Design Test) and that reasoning (both the relational reasoning problems and the
Block Design Test) activated regions in the brain for processing visual images and allocentric
(object-centered) spatial processing as well as areas known for the preparation and execution
of motor responses, all areas involved in visuospatial processing. This study shows that
people with higher visuospatial skill as measured by the Block Design test also had
confirming neurological data supporting additional visuospatial capacity. These participants
also performed better on the reasoning tasks. People’s reasoning ability is limited by the
capacity of the visuospatial system to manipulate multiple premises.
Normally thought to process visually presented information or visually imagined
information, the spatial component of the VSSP is involved in reasoning (Ruff et al., 2003)
and math problems (Trbovich & LeFevre, 2003; Zago & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2002; Houdé, &
Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003). Conditional probability problems do have a math component, also
requiring spatial working memory capacity.

Graph comprehension theory
Research into graph comprehension sheds some additional light on how visuals
should help facilitate reasoning. Eye fixation studies showed that graph comprehension (e.g.,
line charts, bar charts) is an incremental, iterative process that involves encoding a visual
pattern, interpreting the pattern and relating it to elements within the display. This process of
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recognition, interpretation and integration with different and more complex chunks repeats
until a coherent interpretation emerges (Carpenter & Shah, 1998).
Cognitive processes can occur in a top-down fashion, guided by attention control
mechanisms and goal-processing or in a bottom-up fashion driven by visual stimuli (Beck &
Kastner, 2009; Knauff, 2009). Moreover, representation in the visual system is competitive
with bottom-up and top-down cognitive processes influencing the neural competition (Beck
& Kastner, 2009). When a visual object gains dominance in one cognitive system, it will tend
to gain dominance in other cognitive systems (Beck & Kastner, 2009). Processing in
perception starts in the retina and then proceeds to the occipital cortex, with follow-on
processing by the dorsal (“where”) and ventral (“what”) streams in different parts of the
brain. This bottom-up process responds to and is guided by perceptual processes that start
with the eye. Visual processing can also work top-down, in which visual images in memory
or guided by reasoning processes can evoke a pattern of neural activity that involve regions
of the brain that overlap perceptual processing. Perceived and imagined visual objects and
spatial relations use overlapping neural circuits (Knauff, 2009).
Viewers form a mental model of the quantitative information in the graph through an
iterative process of identifying and relating visual patterns to associated variables (Shah,
2002). Through more automatic, bottom-up processing, visual features are mapped to
interpretations and information not explicitly represented in the display is not easily inferred
(Shah, 2002). The person’s prior domain knowledge and graph reading skill interacts with
top-down processing of a graph to affect interpretation. Skilled graph viewers or those with
higher domain knowledge make better inferences from the data regardless of the graph
format (Freedman & Shah, 2002). On the whole, even simpler graphs require a complex set
of cognitive processes for people to comprehend them (Carpenter & Shah, 1998).
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Cognitive load theory
Cognitive load theory (CLT) assumes a limited working memory system that can
manage information for only a few seconds with nearly all information lost after about twenty
seconds unless the information is kept active through a rehearsal mechanism (van
Merriënboer & Sweller, 2010). These limits apply to novel information only, not to
information already encoded in long-term memory. When dealing with long-term memory,
working memory has no practical limitation (van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2010) and can
process more information at one time. Working memory load can be affected in three ways:
•

Intrinsic load, which is directly related to the nature of the task and is dependent
on element interactivity which is defined as relational complexity

•

Extraneous load, which is imposed by the task presentation procedures. How the
information is presented will either reduce or increase extraneous load

•

Germane load, which refers to working memory resources that can be allocated to
managing intrinsic load. People will use germane processing to construct new
schemas that represent the problem and link these new schemas to schemas
already present in long term memory

The distinction between understanding and learning, while not often clear in CLT
research, can be differentiated (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007). Understanding occurs when all
relevant elements of information are processed simultaneously in working memory. Learning
occurs when changes in long-term memory occur. Learning can be explicit (learning is
intentional and the person is aware and can verbalize what is learned) or implicit (person may
be unaware of learning and may not be able to verbalize what was learned). Explicit learning
requires increased germane load to further abstract, find patterns and link the information to
other learned information (Schnotz & Kürschner, 2007).
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While CLT is usually applied to learning environments, it has been used to examine
problem solving and CLT researchers have found that techniques that facilitate partial
understanding may fail to facilitate complete learning. Full comprehension of a complex
problem may require some form of learning, explicit or implicit (Sweller, 1998, Pollock et al.,
2002).

Working memory and short-term memory capacity
Working memory differs from short term memory. Cowan (2008) defines short term
memory as “faculties of the human mind that can hold a limited amount of information in a
very accessible state temporarily.” Miller, et al. (1960) refers to working memory as memory
used to plan and carry out behavior. Cowan (2008) surmises that working memory is used to
retain partial results while working out a math problem without paper or “to combine the
premises in a lengthy rhetorical argument.” Baddeley’s (1986) influential model holds that
verbal-phonological and visuospatial representations are stored separately and managed and
manipulated by the central executive. In Baddeley’s model, working memory is generally
viewed as several components (the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad and the
central executive) working together (Cowan, 2008). The model of working memory put forth
by Cowan (2008) includes short-term memory within working memory..
The evidence for multiple buffers within working memory was supported by studies
that showed verbal tasks interfered with verbal short-term memory but not visual short term
memory and visual tasks interfered with visual short term memory and not verbal short-term
memory (Brooks, 1968, den Heyer & Barrett, 1971; Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). Neuroimaging studies have shown that verbal short term memory relies primarily on
left inferior frontal and right parietal cortices. Visuospatial short term memory relies on right
posterior dorsal frontal and right parietal cortices and object-visual short term memory relies
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on left inferior frontal, left parietal and left inferior temporal cortices (Jonides, et al., 2008;
Awh et al., 1996; Jonides et al. 1993). The neurological data supports the distinction of the
verbal and visual short term memory stores with verbal short term memory with a marked left
hemisphere dominance and visual-spatial and visual-object short term memory with a marked
dorsal versus ventral stream split in the posterior cortices (Jonides, 2008, Ungerleider &
Haxby, 1994; Baddeley, 2003).
Neurological research also shows the distinction between the central executive and
the visual and verbal short term memory stores (Jonides et al. 2008). A meta-analysis of 60
functional neuroimaging studies reveals executive processing relies on dorsolateral frontal
cortex and the posterior parietal cortex (Wagner & Smith, 2003).
Although early research into working memory capacity showed that people can recall
about even chunks of information in short-term memory tasks (Miller, 1956), more recent and
extensive research is placing a lower limit of about four chunks on the capacity limits in
short-term memory (Cowan, 2000, Cowan, et al. 2005; Rouder et al., 2008) across both visual
and verbal tasks. Cowan’s extensive review (2001) identified the following studies that
supported a smaller working memory capacity of about four items.
Table 1. Relevant studies showing working memory is limited to about four items
1. Imposing an information overload
1.1.Visual whole report of spatial arrays (Sperling, 1960)
1.2.Auditory whole report of spatiotemporal arrays (Darwin, et al. 1972)
1.3.Whole report of unattended spoken lists (Cowan, et al. 1999)
2. Preventing long-term memory recoding, passive storage, and rehearsal
2.1.Short-term, serial verbal retention with articulatory suppression (Pollack et al. 1959;
Waugh & Norman, 1965)
2.2.Short-term retention of unrehearsable material (Glanzer & Razel 1974; Jones et al.
1995; Simon 1974; Zhang & Simon 1985)
3. Examining performance discontinuities
3.1.Errorless performance in immediate recall (Broadbent 1975)
3.2.Enumeration reaction time (Mandler & Shebo 1982, Trick & Pylyshyn, 1993)
3.3.Multi-object tracking (Pylyshyn, et al. 1994)
3.4.Proactive interference in immediate memory (Halford, et al. 1988; Wicklegren, 1966)
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4. Examining indirect effects of the limits
4.1.Chunk size in immediate recall (Chase & Simon, 1973; Ericsson, 1985; Ericsson et
al. 1980; Ryan 1969; Wickelgren, 1964)
4.2.Cluster size in long-term recall (Broadbent 1975; Graesser & Mandler, 1978)
4.3.Positional uncertainty in recall (Nairne, 1991)
4.4.Analysis of the recency effect in recall (Watkins, 1974)
4.5.Sequential effects in implicit learning and memory (Cleeremans & McClelland 1991;
McKone, 1995)
4.6.Influence of capacity on properties of visual search (Fisher, 1984)
4.7.Influence of capacity on mental addition reaction time (Logan, 1988; Logan &
Klapp, 1991)
4.8.Mathematical modeling parameters (Halford et al., 1998; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978;
Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981)
Cowan (2000) categorizes the literate he reviewed regarding working memory
limitations into four groups (Table 1). In the first group, researchers have estimated capacity
by using a large number of elements that overwhelm the person’s ability to rehearse or
otherwise encode the information. This approach lets them approximate the limits of working
memory by measuring task performance with fewer or more elements to be processed in
working memory. In the second category, researchers create experimental conditions that
discourage rehearsal or recoding of new items using articulatory suppression (a secondary
task in which the subject has to repeat an utterance during the presentation of items and
perhaps during recall of the presented items), or present items that are too long to verbally
rehearse. This track of research suppresses continual rehearsal as a technique for managing
elements in working memory. Rehearsal may give participants an alternate strategy for
managing larger numbers of elements in working memory that interferes with measuring
working memory capacity. Suppression is a technique that helps researchers infer the limits
of working memory capacity. The third group of studies includes research that shows a
significant drop off in performance at about 4 items. People can manage a larger number of
elements in working memory capacity via rehearsal or chunking. Some studies have noted
that the time require to perform working memory tasks slowly increases from one to four
items and then rises at a faster rate after four items. This performance discontinuity is another
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means if inferring working memory capacities, especially when non-working memory
resources cannot be suppressed in the experimental task. The fourth category included
research that, rather than relying on recall of presented items, observed capacity limits
indirectly from the experimental task. In this category, Cowan includes Miller’s (1956)
seminal work on the magical number 7 +/- 2, and other studies showing that larger numbers
of items are “chunked” together with each chunk containing 3-4 items aiding performance.
While the object of these studies wasn’t in attempting to directly test limits of working
memory, the discovery of optimal chunk size is a means for inferring working memory
capacity.
In Baddeley’s comments on Cowan’s review (Cowan, 2000), Baddeley welcomed the
review of the lower number finding it persuasive and posited the lower limit of about four
elements for worming memory capacity as being drawn from the central executive and its
related storage system, the episodic buffer (see also Baddeley, 2010). In this open peer
commentary portion of Cowan’s review, of the 37 responses, two reviewers disputed his
claim of “about 4” as a limit of working memory. The rest of the responses either strongly
confirmed the lower limit of four, or acknowledged the limit but posed several challenges to
Cowan’s theory of a unitary store as being responsible for this lower limit. For the purposes
of this study, the exact mechanism responsible for the lower limit of four items in working
memory is not of concern. The insight that a large body of research is strongly indicating
working memory is constrained to about four elements (or chunks) at a time may be useful
for thinking about how to construct visuals to aid in conditional probability problems. Prior
research into these problems has overlooked this key constraint.
When people solve problems, they rely on short-term memory of both the visual and
verbal short term memory stores for maintenance of information needed for the problem.
People also rely on limited central executive processing capacity to maintain focus and
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attention, and to manipulate the various components of working memory. This processing of
the problem, while perhaps distinct from storage of information needed for the problem in
visual or verbal form, is also limited to the relating of four entities (Halford, Wilson &
Phillips, 1998; Andrews, Birney & Halford, 2006; Halford, Baker, McCredden & Bain, 2005;
Halford, Cowen & Andrews, 2007; Awh, Barton & Vogel, 2007; Birney, Halford & Andrews,
2006; Saults & Cowen, 2007). Thus, both processing and storage are severely constrained to
about four elements.

Relational complexity
Relational complexity is defined as the number of relations that must be processed in
parallel, that is, at the same time, to perform a task (Halford et al., 1998; Halford et al., 2010).
As relational complexity increases, the processing complexity of a cognitive process
increases. While a cognitive process may be made up of several steps, the complexity of the
process is the measure of the complexity of its most complex task. Process complexity is
affected by how many interdependent elements have to be processed in parallel at one time,
not how many have to be processed over time.
One example of a simpler relation is the “The dog is bigger than the cat” which,
following Halford et al. (1998) translates to the binary relation bigger-than(dog, cat). Binary
relations are similar to one-way experimental designs. Ternary relations contain three
interacting elements are analogous to a two-way experiment design that contains a relation
binding one dependent and two independent variables (Halford et al., 1998). The maximum
relational complexity adults can normally process is the quaternary relationship which binds
four interactive elements.
A simple task, such as selecting a restaurant based on how much money one has, can
be described as a problem with a binary relationship (Halford, et al., 1998). The money-
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restaurant relation has a set of ordered pairs; in this case, an amount of money is associated
with a restaurant (or a group of restaurants). The money-restaurant relation can be expanded
to include importance as a factor. Important occasions might call for more expensive
restaurants, although importance may have more influence when one has a lot of money than
when one has little, in which case, the money factor has a greater influence (Halford, et al.,
1998). Relational complexity is also analogous to the number of factors in an experiment
design. Continuing with the Halford et al. (1998) explanation, a one-way experiment design
is equivalent to a binary relation between the one independent and the one dependent variable
(Halford, et al., 1998). Expanding the analogy, “a two-way experiment design is equivalent to
a ternary relation between one dependent and two independent variables.” More interacting
variables increases the number of observations or participants needed for a study, which is
analogous to the increased processing load generated by problems with high relational
complexity. Relational complexity is then, the number of interacting relations that are then
bound to specific elements. Problems become more complex as the number of interacting
factors increase. Processing complexity is related to the number of arguments in a relation
(Halford, et al., 1998).
Halford et al (1998) note that complexity depends on the actual cognitive processes
being employed and depends on individual attributes such as age, experience, and problem
representation attributes. All of these factors will affect how task elements are chunked
(collapsed into a single element) or segmented (sequenced rather than processed in parallel).
Measures of processing complexity must be specific to the actual cognitive process used.
Processing relations or premises often involves ambiguity than can be resolved when these
relations or premises are considered jointly, or at the same time. Planning a correct strategy to
solve a problem depends first on representing the complete structure of the problem. This
planning process, if it has to process many relations, can impose high processing loads.
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Relational theory predicts that people’s need to process premises jointly will increase
processing load (Halford, Wilson & Phillips, 1998).
The account of working memory put forth by Oberauer et al. (2007) has much in
common with both a mental models account of reasoning and the relational complexity
theory. Oberauer et al. (2007) says working memory capacity ‘reflects the ability to keep
several chunks of information simultaneously available for direct access’ (p 50). Working
memory is limited in the mind’s ability to establish multiple and simultaneous temporary
bindings. This limits a person’s ability to construct new relational representations (p. 69).
Mental model construction is constrained by the complexity of the model itself and the
working memory capacity, especially the ability for the person to focus attention to the
features of the model: Working memory capacity relies on:
“… a mechanism that quickly establishes and dissolves temporary bindings between
these elements and positions in a cognitive coordinate system, or placeholders in a
schema. Direct access to a multitude of separate elements is necessary to construct
new relations between them and integrate into new structural representations. The
limited capacity for relational integration is the most important limiting factor for
reasoning ability.” (Oberauer, et al., 2007).
In a neurological study, Kroger, et al. (2002) confirmed that increasing relational
complexity from 0 to 4 in a reasoning problem dramatically increased the percentage of
errors and the time in processing, as well as increasing activation in areas of the brain
associated with working memory.

Cognitive load theory and relational complexity in HCI Research
Both relational complexity theory and cognitive load theory appear as constructs in
human computer interaction research. A body of research has examined what contributes to
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task complexity within the realm of safety and ergonomics, design of instructional interfaces
and the correlation of physiological measurements with task complexity (Crosby, Iding &
Chin, 2003). Researchers have applied relational complexity theory to examine complexity of
interfaces for air traffic control devices (Xing 2004, 2007, 2008), to usability analysis for
consumer products (Lo & Helander, 2004) and to computer security data visualization (Suo,
Zhu & Owen, 2009).
Cognitive load theory has been used to analyze entity-relationship diagram
comprehension (Masri, Parker & Gemino, 2008), to relate cognitive load to user satisfaction
with e-Commerce applications when higher cognitive load resulted in less user satisfaction,
Schmutz, Heinz, Métrailler & Opwis, 2009) and to examine its impact on Internet queries
(Dennis, McArthur & Bruza, 1998; Joseph, Yukawa, Suthers & Harada, 2006). Despite the
more extensive research programs that look at relational complexity theory and cognitive
load in learning and cognitive science research tracks, only a handful of studies have
examined the role of cognitive load in human-computer interaction (Schmutz et al., 2009).

SYNTHESIS AND KEY FINDINGS
Conditional probability problems, as normally presented both in real-life and in much
of the prior research, usually require people to maintain between three and seven distinct
elements or entities. While techniques for simplifying the process of solving conditional
probability problems (e.g., natural frequency, clearly labeling and representing sets) have
been researched, the role of visuals has been conflicting and very little of the prior research
has focused on non-learning environments. In addition, none of the research has examined
the impact the number of potentially interacting elements in the problem presentation may
have on user performance. Further research into the relationship between the number of
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problem elements and the use of visuals to improve performance in real-world, every day
problem solving is in order.
To improve performance, the display would need to take into account that conditional
probability problems require people to build mental models in a limited working memory.
Mental model premises and relations between elements are processed in visuospatial working
memory, which varies in capacity from individual to individual and is limited. As the research
into working memory capacity and relational complexity shows, this limit is most likely
about four independent items processed at a time. According to graph comprehension theory,
visuals can help by providing more automatic bottom-up processing that can guide or limit
the focus of attention to a smaller number of appropriate elements of the problem. In
addition, by shifting elements of the problem from a verbal form to a visual form may help
people balance processing across multiple components of working memory (the phonological
loop and the visuospatial scratchpad). By carefully controlling the display to address working
memory constraints, including keeping the user’s focus of attention on a limited number of
elements of the problem at a time and use visual elements in lieu of text wherever reasonably
possible, extraneous cognitive load introduced by the presentation of the problem is reduced,
allowing the user to then effectively apply germane cognitive load.
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CHAPTER 3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Conditional probability problems typically require people to maintain four distinct
elements or entities (the probability of event A and event B co-occurring, event A without
event B, the probability of event B without A and the probability of neither event A and B
occurring) or minimally three distinct elements (a sample population, a positive diagnostic
population and a positive incident population). Depending on how the conditional probability
is presented, it may contain up to six or seven elements, for which people have to select the
correct three or four elements needed for a correct inference.
To select the proper elements, people have to read and process the problem text, build
a mental model that depicts the relationships between each of the elements (in this case the
nested set structure), refer to the appropriate numbers within the display (a frequency or a
percentage), confirm the mental model comports to the external representation (the visual
display), and then carry out the appropriate math to calculate a correct answer. Both the
maintenance of each of the elements, (along with their labels and numbers) and the
processing required to comprehend the set of relationships between the elements and validate
among multiple competing relationships, can exceed the storage and processing limit of four
independent elements at one time. In order for people to be aided by visuals in solving these
problems, the information display will invariably need to limit potential element interactivity.
Following the review of literature above, conditional probability problems have the
following attributes that can cause difficulty for people. First these problems appear to be
novel problems. Because of lack of deep familiarity with Bayes’ theorem, people are unable
to apply Bayes’ theorem or an equivalent strategy from long-term memory. Second these
problems require use of a limited working memory capacity to build a mental model
depicting the state of affairs of the problem. Third these problems have a number of
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interacting elements that can potentially exceed the working memory constraint of
simultaneously processing about four independent elements.

HOW VISUALS CAN IMPROVE PERFORMANCE
According to Halford, et al. (1998), relational complexity is the number of interacting
elements (variables) that must be represented in working memory in parallel to perform a
task. Conditional probability problems typically contain three and can contain as many as six
or seven elements that might need to be processed in parallel. Based on relational complexity
theory, mental models theory, cognitive load theory and the theories of working memory
discussed in Chapter 2, for visuals to reliably help with these kinds of problems, designers
need to consider the following:

A. Through perceptual cueing mechanisms such as highlighting and controlling what
is visible in the display, restrict the user’s focus of attention to the task of relating
two independent elements at a time. This should help people, especially those with
low working memory capacity, by controlling the building of a partial mental
model, thus facilitating the development of a full mental model.

B. Use visuals to depict relationships between entities rather than describing the
relationship with words. In other words, replace words with images to reduce the
load on working memory and the need for the user to switch between
verbal/linguistic reading of text and visual/spatial diagram processing.

C. Repeat the process of cueing and processing fewer rather than more elements at a
time to help the user make a series of correct inferences. Since working memory is
conserved by preventing the number of independently interacting elements from
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exceeding four items, this should aid the user in building and validating a mental
model and improve the accuracy of additional inferences.
Using this approach, the study expects to show that people’s performance (speed and
correct inferences) and satisfaction with the display will improve when the visual displays
minimize element interactivity, encourage building partial models by limiting displays to
fewer interacting elements at a time and substitute images for words to depict relationships.
Prior research may have inadequately controlled the relationship between visual and textual
elements as these guidelines suggest. If shown to be true and these display guidelines are
followed, Euler and Venn type diagrams might be safely used in conditional probability
problems.

HYPOTHESES
Based on relational complexity theory, diagrams with less element interactivity should
perform better than diagrams with high element interactivity. Since working memory is
limited to a small number of elements that can be independently related to each other (about
four) (Halford, et al., 1998), diagrams that reduce the number of independently interacting
elements will help users solve conditional probability problems better than diagrams with
more independently related items. When element interacting interactivity is too high, working
memory will be overloaded, negating the benefits of a diagrammatic representation. This
study will compare the performance for Venn and Euler-like diagrams and text-only
representations with low relational complexity (three interacting elements) and high relational
complexity (six interacting elements).
Based on the relevant literature, for conditional probability problems the designer of
the display must limit the user’s attention to a few elements at a time. This can be done by
giving the user perceptual cues such as shading, color or sequencing to focus their attention
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on a small number of elements at a time. Controlling the sequencing of processing the various
elements reduces element interactivity. This approach should help people build a partial
mental model and integrate the partial model into a full model where the correct inference
can then be made (Pollock, Chandler & Sweller, 2002).
Neurological research into reasoning problems like the conditional probability
problem shows central executive (CE) and visuospatial (VSSP) working memory
involvement (Knauff, 2007, 2009; Kroger et al., 2002; Ruff, et al., 2003). The close
relationship between CE and VSSP resources in reasoning is not surprising. Tests of spatial
ability, especially the 2-D and 3-D manipulations within the paper folding tests and block
design tests, may have a positive correlation with measures of central executive ability
(Miyake, et al., 2001). For these reasons, the conditional probability problem involves both
the VSSP and the CE for processing the visual (an external representation) and building the
mental model to solve the problem (an internal representation). The display will need to
reduce cognitive load so that the processing of the problem and the processing of the visual
do not overload working memory resources. Keeping the potential element interactivity
limited will save CE and VSSP working memory resources.
By using visuals to help solve the problem, designers can reduce the amount of text
needed to depict the state of affairs. This eases the demands on the phonological loop, thus
conserving working memory resources. By removing or reducing the text and using a visual
display the user spends less effort processing the textual component to the problems. As users
process the problem text, the user also starts to build a mental model of the relationships
between the elements and may have to switch between the text and the visual. Visual
elements that replace textual elements can offload some of this PL processing to the VSSP.
This serves as a form of off-loaded memory to an external representation in which users can
refer to items visually in the display, bringing elements back into working memory attention
- 39 -

more easily (Larkin & Simon, 1997; Stenning & Oberlander, 1995). A visual display can also
“constrain the range of possible cognitive actions” and thus prevent error and encourage
proper conclusions (Zhang, 1997; Zhang & Norman, 1994).

Hypothesis 1
Under both high and low levels of relational complexity, users will demonstrate
higher performance with diagrams than with text.
When the problem is simplified by controlling relational complexity (as in the low
complexity treatments), demands on working memory will be reduced with either display
(diagrams or text). Diagrams should help by further relieving working memory by
substituting visuals in place of some text (reducing the amount of text processing needed) and
by providing visual cues and guidance than can’t be equivalently done in a simpler text-only
representation. While the low relational complexity display, both in a text and a visual form,
attempts to restrict the number of elements needed to integrate to three at a time, the visual
form of the problem can provide additional visual cues that can guide users’ attention using
bottom-up perceptual processes.
Even if the problem has high relational complexity, diagrams should still facilitate
performance. Since working memory is predicted to be overwhelmed in the complex, textonly display, visual aids can have an effect by substituting some of the text processing with
diagrams and providing visual cues that can guide users’ attention via bottom-up perceptual
processes. This ought to help users determine the relevant sets to consider while determining
an answer. While performance in the diagram or text-only condition is expected to be
strongly influenced by complexity, the role of the visual under these two conditions is of
interest. Visuals should be able to provide support for both low and high complexity versions
of this problem.
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Hypothesis 2
Under both high and low levels of relational complexity, users will have higher
satisfaction with diagrams than with text.
Since the purpose of this study is to examine performance in a non-learning
environment, it will be important that users perceive the displays as being easy to use and
facilitating their performance. In of order for displays to be used in everyday, voluntary
adoption contexts, user satisfaction will be important. Perceived usefulness and perceived
ease of use (Davis, 1989) are two well-established constructs for predicting technology
adoption. Davis (1989) defines perceived usefulness as “the degree to which a person
believes that using a particular system would enhance his or her job performance.” Perceived
ease of use refers to “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system
would be free from effort.” Together, these two constructs have explained nearly 40% of the
variance in an individual’s intention to use technology (Venkatesh, Morris & Davis, 2003).

Hypothesis 3
Under both the text and diagram conditions, users will demonstrate higher
performance with problems of lower relational complexity than with problems of higher
relational complexity.
Since working memory demands will be reduced with low relational complexity
displays that have less element interactivity, users will generate more correct answers. Some
of the problems with the use of visuals in prior research may be a result of researchers failing
to consider the number of interacting elements in conditional probability problems, the
overall working memory demands of these problems and the limited working memory
resources available.
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Hypothesis 4
Under both the text and diagram conditions, users will have higher satisfaction with
problems of lower relational complexity than with problems of higher relational complexity.
Relational complexity is likely to have an impact on satisfaction. A low relational
complexity display will place less cognitive demands on the user and as a result will be likely
to be perceived as easier to use. The perceived ease of use component of the adoption model
proposed by Davis (1989) refers to the degree a person believes that using a particular system
would be free from difficulty or great effort. In most real-world situations, adoption of
particular displays by both sender and receiver of the communication is likely to be
voluntary. As the TAM adoption framework (David, 1989) has shown, perceptions of ease of
use and usefulness affect adoption.
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CHAPTER 4. METHOD
This study recruited 158 participants from a large research university and examined
the impact that text-only and diagrammatic representations with two levels of relational
complexity have on participant performance and satisfaction with conditional probability
problems.

PARTICIPANTS
This study used both students and staff participants at a major research university with
varying ages and backgrounds in order to better approximate real-world populations. Many
prior studies show participants’ accuracy on conditional probability of problems is low to
intermediate, ranging from 6% of the problems correct to 62% depending on the textual
format (Brase,et al., 1998; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). Most of these existing studies use
top-tier national university undergraduate students as participants (Brase, Fiddick, and
Harries, 2006) with greater working memory capacity than the normal population, which
decreases over time (Hale, et al., 2008).
What this means is that a person in a real-world setting is likely to have less working
memory capacity than a participants used in typical studies. Most real-world situations, such
as a health care professional explaining the probability of having a disease given a positive
test result or a risk management professional attempting to explain the probability of a
sequence of events, are likely to involve people with a wider range of working memory.
Interface designers will need to develop improved methods for conveying this information to
people with a variety of working memory capacity using displays that can be accessed via the
Internet (for example, electronic health care), or within computer-based decision support
tools. By relying on a more diverse population, this study’s results may have greater
generalizability.
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Participants were recruited across via email notifications and through regular
recruitment methods used in colleges. Participants included students from several colleges on
campus and staff and faculty members. About one-third of the participants were older than
the traditional undergraduate college student.

EXPERIMENT DESIGN
This study used a 2X2 factorial design with the two factors being complexity and
display type. Complexity has two levels: low and high. Display type has two levels: text-only
and diagrams. This constitutes four treatments: simple text (3T), complex text (6T), simple
diagram (3D) and complex diagram (6D).
Table 2. Experiment design

Display
type

Relational complexity
Low relational
complexity

High relational
complexity

Text

Simple text (3T)

Complex text (6T)

Diagram

Simple diagram (3D)

Complex diagram (6D)

Because participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups in the factorial
design, this is a between-subjects design. High relational complexity problems contained six
(6) interacting elements participants had to process before integrating them and computing an
answer and low relational complexity problems had three (3) interacting elements to consider
before computing an answer. Each problem asked a question in which the user has to infer a
posterior probability. For each problem, the user had to mentally select among the different
elements which ones need to be combined for a final number and determine the proper
mathematical relationships between the elements. In order to restrict the problem to fewer
interacting elements, low relational complexity diagrams let the user select and combine three
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or fewer elements at a time in two steps with the last step containing the question with the
measured answer.
The independent variables are relational complexity (low relational complexity and
high relational complexity) and display type (text-only and diagrams). The nature of the
conditional probability problem is such that the four critical sets participants have to consider
(H, not H, D and not D) can be expressed linguistically in two ways: with six interacting
elements or three interacting elements (see the discussion below on treatments). This split
also corresponds well with the working memory limit of about four independent elements.
This convenient split in representation inherent in the conditional problem will allow this
study to examine the role of relational complexity and display type on participant
performance while considering working memory limits. The dependent variables will be
performance and satisfaction (discussed in a later section).

TREATMENTS
Four treatments were used. Text only treatments with low and high relational
complexity and diagram treatments of low and high relational complexity were used. For
both text and diagram conditions, low relational complexity treatments had three interacting
elements at a time and high relational complexity problems had six interacting elements at a
time displayed. The diagram representation used Venn and Euler type diagrams to depict the
relationship between elements of the conditional probability problems along with text to
identify the visual elements and convey the problem background and questions. Text-only
displays did not have any diagrammatic elements or visuals. A battery of ten conditional
probability problems was used in each treatment, with some problems replicated from prior
studies.
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Applying Relational Complexity
This study used the number of potentially interacting elements in the problem
representation as the measure representing complexity. In order to derive a metric
representing complexity, the process model for the actual cognitive task needs to be
considered (Halford, et al. 1998). Applying Shah, Mayer and Hegarty’s (1999) description of
the dominant model for graph comprehension to the problems considered in this study, the
users of a display have to:
1. Read and process the problem text and identify the important elements
2. Build a mental model that depicts the relationships between each of the
visual and/or textual elements (in this case the nested set structure)
3. Relate the elements to the appropriate numbers within the display and
confirm the internal mental model comports to the external representation
4. Carry out the appropriate math to calculate a correct answer.
These steps are done incrementally and interactively as users work through a problem
(Shah, et al., 1999). In the case of conditional probability problems, the complexity of this
task isn’t just the arity of the final computed relation (in this study all problems, text and
visual, low or high complexity are, in the final correct computation, ternary relations), but in
the process for testing and finally determining the relevant elements to include in a final
computation. The maximum relational complexity of the conditional probability task is likely
to be encountered in step two of the iterative four step process.
Figure 1 (the Blue Cab conditional probability problem, see Appendix G) has five
critical elements in the display which need to be related to the element stated in the problem
question (20 future accidents). This problem has within it many binary relationships, a larger
number of ternary relationships and at least one quaternary relationship (the basic conditional
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probability contingency table). The total number of relations possible from these six elements
(derived from the formula p = n!/(r!(n-r)!) for calculating permutations in which n is the
number of elements in total, r is the number of elements selected and p is the total
permutations for the given selection) is 63 relations or sets.
For example, expressing the three elements in Figure 2 (Cabs tested, Cabs identified
as Blue and 50 future accidents) as elements A, B and C, generates the following set of seven
possible relations, including three unary, three binary and one ternary relation to consider:
{A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, ABC}. The user has to decide which one (or more) of these sets need
to be considered as valid, what type of relation exists (subset, superset, conditional
relationship) between the elements and what mathematical computations to perform for the
given relations. In studies of errors that people (both adults and children) make in solving
conditional probability problems, people consistently incorrectly choose the set of elements
(the relation) and incorrectly choose the mathematical operators relating elements (Zhu &
Gigerenzer, 2006; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995), with children consistently choosing fewer
(typically two) elements when incorrectly solving the problem rather than more.
Problem representations that keep the number of elements needed to integrate to three
or less have significantly fewer possible sets for users to consider. Consistent with the
comments from Halford et al. (1998) that despite different representations a problem that are
isomorphic when solved correctly -- as they are in this study -- the planning process (step 2
above) requires users to represent the problem as a whole. Displays with more potentially
interactive elements and thus more combinations of relations to consider may result in higher
processing loads and more user error. This study used the number of potentially interacting
elements in the high and low complexity conditions as the measure that captures the
increased processing load that higher relational complexity imposes. Since three (3)
interacting element generates up to seven (7) combinations of relations and is far less than the
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63 combinations of relations in the problem representations with six interacting elements, the
processing load for the less complex problem representations should be less and user answers
should be more frequently correct.
The combination of verbal and visual cues in each of the treatments needs to help
guide the user into building the right mental model and the establishing the correct formula
for relating the elements needed. While the hidden structure of the problem is simple, the
process the user may go through to identify the hidden problem structure is complex and the
user is likely to be overwhelmed with a plethora of relations ranging in relational complexity
and in total count to consider iteratively.
This study proposes that conditional probability problems with six potentially
interacting elements have more processing complexity than problems with three potentially
interacting elements. Participants are likely to test more combinations of elements and
potentially build mental models with greater relational complexity when presented with
problems that have more potentially interacting elements than fewer. This will cause
participants to make more errors; those with less working memory capacity are likely to make
more errors than those participants with more working memory capacity. Using displays that
simplify the problem solving process by reducing the number of potentially interacting
elements and by using diagrams to provide visual cues for identifying the correct relations
ought to improve user performance.

Diagram treatments
In prior research and in real life examples, depending on the presentation, conditional
probability problems can have a high degree of element interactivity.
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Diagram with high relational complexity (Treatment 6D)

Figure 1 shows this study’s treatment of the conditional probability problem with a
high number of interacting elements. This example has five separate elements, with two
additional elements nested within one larger set (Cabs identified as blue). The problem asks
users to examine the elements and identify which elements from the diagram ought to be
included in a simple mathematical operation involving a sixth number contained within the
problem question.
Figure 1. A diagram with a high relational complexity

In the above problem, the following elements are identified:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Blue cabs (15)
Green Cabs (85)
Cabs identified as blue (29)
Blue cabs identified as blue (12)
Green cabs identified as Blue (17)
Future accidents with cabs identified as Blue (20)
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These six elements must be examined and a portion of them combined to compute the
proper answer, in this case, the future accidents with Blue cabs identified actually being Blue
cabs. The correct answer here involves the “Blue cabs identified as blue” set, the “Cabs
identified as blue” set and the “20 accidents over the next few months” set. The correct
mathematical computation is (12/29)*20 or 8.
The user’s challenge in this problem is to understand the problem text, maintain the
linkage of the text labels to the visual elements, determine which elements are relevant to
computing the answer, determine the nature of the relationship between the relevant elements
and then to build a mental model (an internal representation inside the mind) that can then be
used to produce a final answer. In this example, the mathematical model is in the form of
(a/b)*c.
Diagram with low relational complexity (Treatment 3D)

An example of a conditional probability problem with fewer interacting elements is
shown in Figure 2 and 3. In this problem, which in its final question is computationally
identical to the more complex problem previously discussed, the diagram represents only two
visual elements (and associated numbers) at a time and asks the user to integrate the problem
text into a mathematical form for an intermediate answer (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Part one of a diagram with a low relational complexity
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Figure 3. Part two of a diagram with a low relational complexity

In Figure 3, the problem text shows the user the final and complete visual, but
explicitly greys out the initial element, indicating its lesser relevancy to the final problem
question. The visual cue is designed to constrain cognitive action. By breaking the display
into two steps and using perceptual cues to guide the user in lieu of text, relational
complexity is significantly reduced. Using the visual to guide incremental mental model
construction may help users shift needed elements in an out of attention, facilitating
discovering and executing the correct computation. In the text of the above, simpler problem,
the following elements are identified and clearly visible (not greyed out):
1. Cabs identified as Blue (29)
2. Cabs actually Blue (12)
3. Future accidents with cabs identified as Blue (20)
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Again, these three elements must be examined and combined to compute the proper
answer; in this case it is the number of future accidents with Blue cabs identified actually
being Blue cabs. In this visual, the maximum number of elements to be included in a
mathematical relationship is kept to three elements or fewer.

Text Treatments
For the text-only treatments, this study will use a similar approach, except no
diagrams, shading or lines will be used.
Text display with high relational complexity (Treatment 6T)

High relational complexity problems will have six potentially interacting elements
within the depiction of the problem which need to be related to the element indicated in the
problem question. For example, the high relational complexity version of the Blue Cab
problem is:
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green
and the Blue, operate cabs in the city. On the night of the accident, a witness said the
cab was Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility
conditions with Blue and Green cabs by conducting 100 tests on the witness. When
the cabs were really Blue, the witness said they were Blue in 12 out of 15 tests. When
the cabs were really Green, the witness said they were Blue in 17 out of 85 tests.
Overall, the witness identified 29 cabs as Blue.
Question: If 20 accidents occurred over the next few months in which the witness said
the cab was Blue, how many accidents would a Blue cab actually be involved in?
As in the diagram display type, this problem has the same six interacting elements,
but without any diagrams or other visual elements.
Text display with low relational complexity (Treatment 3T)

The low complexity version of this treatment follows the same approach as the lowcomplexity diagram version (D3) first display requiring the participant to answer a question
involving integration of just three elements at a time which is then followed with a second
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asking a question requiring the user to integrate an additional three elements. Unlike the
diagrammatic representation, visual cues such as diagrams and shading will not be used.

Display 1
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green
and the Blue, operate cabs in the city. On the night of the accident, a witness said the
cab was Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility
conditions with Blue and Green cabs by conducting 100 tests on the witness. In 29 of
those tests, the witness said the cab was Blue.
Question: If 50 accidents occurred over the next year, how many times would this
witness say the cab was Blue?
Display 2
A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green
and the Blue, operate cabs in the city. On the night of the accident, a witness said the
cab was Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility
conditions with Blue and Green cabs by conducting 100 tests on the witness. In 29 of
those tests, the witness said the cab was Blue. In the tests in which the witness said
the cab was Blue, the cab was actually Blue 12 times.
Question: If 20 accidents occurred over the next few months in which the witness said
the cab was Blue, how many accidents would a Blue cab actually be involved in?
Treatment Attributes To Control
In order to ensure generalizability and to avoid other confounding factors, various
aspects of the conditional probability problem were consistently controlled across all four
versions of the problem. The features controlled include: the use of natural frequencies;
independence of complexity and visual representation, a consistent mathematical form;
prevalence, sensitivity and specificity rates; clear labeling; use of diagrams, reference class
size; distance effect; and comparability to other research.
Natural frequencies

Since the purpose of this study is to examine how reducing the number of interacting
elements can facilitate people’s performance with diagrams and since a large body of research
shows that natural frequency representations elicit more accurate responses, the problems in
this study all use natural frequency formats. Natural frequencies help because they simplify
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the math involved in calculating posterior probabilities and they make relationships between
sets or elements clearer (Brase & Barby, 2006).
Independence of complexity and visual representation

In order to ensure that relational complexity is preserved in both the low and high
complexity problems regardless of the display type (text or visual), the battery of ten
problems maintain a consistent number of potentially interactive elements (3 and 6) in both
the text and the visual representation. Because of this, the exact same number of possible
relations to consider (7 and 63) is maintained in both the text-only and diagrammatic
representation of the problems. Diagrammatic displays do use visual cues where possible
(replacing visual elements in place of some words, using shading to guide focus), but
preserve the same number of elements and possible relations to consider.
Consistent final mathematical form

Conditional probability problems follow a consistent mathematical formula based on
Bayes theorem. As explained, natural frequency formats simplify the math involved. All these
problem, whether they are medical problems or not, can be represented just like medical
diagnostic information with base rates (the prevalence of a disease, e.g., 8 in 1,000 have
cancer), sensitivity (e.g., for someone who has cancer, the test comes back positive 90% of
the time) and specificity (e.g., for someone who does not have cancer, the test will be
accurate 95% of the time) rates. All problems, regardless of their visual or text-only
representation, involve the exact same mathematical formula to carry out the computation
needed for a correct answer and will have a final mathematical form of (a/b)*c.
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Prevalence, sensitivity, specificity, labeling, reference class size

To ensure generalizability across different forms of this problem likely to be
encountered in many real-world situations, the treatments were constructed with a range of
prevalence, sensitivity and specificity rates ranging from 1-90%, 5-93% and 33-99%.
People have difficulty with conditional probability problems because the problem text
(and possibly the visual) does not make clear to what subset each of the probabilities belongs
(Macchi, 2000). Therefore, in each treatment, all labels and text have been worded to clearly
indicate how labels refer to visual elements and how the problem text refers to the diagram
labels. Also, some research indicates people may make errors in answers based on reference
class size (size of the populations within each problem). When people are asked to make
judgments on smaller population sizes (less than 100), some biases disappear (Brase, 2002).
Treatments in this study have a range of reference class sizes from small (less than 50) to
large (in the thousands) to ensure generalizability.
Use of diagrams

The visual treatments will use Venn and Euler type diagrams. While some prior
research into conditional probability problems has found these types of diagrams to be at a
disadvantage in aiding users, Venn and Euler diagrams are widely used in everyday use and
in diverse research problems. In order to prevent additional confounding factors from
complicating this study and in order to give insight into the factors that can affect diagram
performance, this study used a consistent diagrammatic representation for all visual
problems. The use of diagrams allowed for a 10.4% reduction in word count compared with
the text-only versions of the problems.
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Distance effect

The relative size of the key classes in these treatments may matter. The distance
effect, in which “discriminating two numbers that are numerically far apart is easier than
discriminating two numbers that are numerically close” (van Opstal, et al., 2008) is well
established in numerical cognition research. The set of problems in this study has a range of
“distance” of the two key numbers (a/b) from 1 (where the two sets are identical in size) to 12
(where one set is 12 times larger than the other set). Problems in which the relative distance
between the two key elements numbers is greater (e.g., 1 and 50 versus 34 and 45) may be
easier for participants to distinguish and hence, easier for them to identify, hold separate in
working memory and integrate into a mental model.
Use of problems from prior studies

Because the treatment manipulations within this study are designed to improve user
performance, this study includes two classic Bayesian reasoning problems (the
mammography problem and the Blue Cab problem), preserving the original prevalence,
sensitivity and specificity rates for each problem. This will allow some comparability with
prior research. Since much research has been done with text-only representations, the textonly displays can serve as a baseline group to provide comparability to prior research.

Other control variables and covariates
To test for individual differences and their effect on problem performance,
participants completed a pre-test survey that collects background information (age, gender,
educational level, probability reasoning experience, skill, and whether English is a native
language). Because spatial ability may contribute to, if not be the primary source of user
performance with regards to relational complexity (Halford, et al., 2007) and is used for
processing spatial diagrams (Hegarty 2000, 1997), this study measured spatial ability and
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used it as a covariate. Based on prior research, spatial ability may interact with both
complexity and display type since it serves as a predictor and a component of problem
solving performance. Treating spatial ability as a covariate will let this study determine the
impact the two main factors have on performance independent of spatial ability. The paper
folding test from Ekstrom, French & Hardon (1976) was used to measure spatial ability.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
This study has two dependent measures: user performance and user satisfaction. User
performance was measured by one dependent variable: number of correct answers out of the
ten in the battery of problems. User satisfaction was comprised of two confirmed factors from
the Davis (1989) technology adoption model survey.
Participants expressed the answers to the conditional probability problems in whole
numbers and were allowed to round up or down to the next integer. Since some participants
may choose to do the math using percentages instead of fractions, correct answers are also
allowed for different decimal places of percentages (e.g., 23%, 23.3% or 23.27%) when the
percentage is used in an intermediate step in calculating the final answer.
User satisfaction was measured by a 14-item questionnaire based on Davis’ (1989)
technology acceptance model (TAM). In this model, perceived ease of use and perceived
usefulness are two key determinants on user adoption of technology. Each item in the
questionnaire was presented as a statement with a response on a 7-point Likert scale.
The hypotheses were tested by ANCOVA (for performance), ANOVA (for
satisfaction) and t-tests comparing the means of dependent variables (number correct,
perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness satisfaction scores) between the low and high
complexity treatment groups and the text and diagram treatment groups.
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PROCEDURE
The study was approved by DePaul University’s institutional review board (IRB)
while the lab sessions and data collection was completed at the University of Kentucky
facilities. The University of Kentucky agreed to allow DePaul University be the IRB of
record. Both parties (DePaul University and the University of Kentucky) signed an IRB
authorization agreement authorizing the research to be conducted at the University of
Kentucky with DePaul University as the controlling IRB. DePaul University approved the
research project with exempt status. Two lab study supervisors and the principal investigator
all obtained human research and ethics certification through the Collaborative Institute
Training Initiative. The lab study supervisors managed the participant recruitment processed
and helped manage session materials. Participants were recruited across campus via several
approved means of approved recruitment including general email notifications and
participation in the University of Kentucky’s College of Communications research
recruitment process. Participants were recruiting with an incentive lottery for two iPad tablet
devices. The lab study supervisors administered the lottery process.
A small pilot session was conducted first to test the software and instruments and
ensure the overall procedure worked correctly and determine the timing needed for the entire
procedure. The study was conducted in a PC workstation lab setting in nine sessions over an
eight week period. Participants had as long as needed complete the pre-test survey and the
post-test survey and had 60 minutes to complete the 10 conditional probability problems. The
spatial ability test was a timed test that took six minutes to complete and was delivered via
pencil and paper rather than the computer. Participants first took the pre-test survey to collect
non-identifying information (age, area of study, skill with probabilities, and level of
education). This was followed by the paper folding spatial ability test, taken with a pencil and
paper. After the spatial ability test, participants completed the suite of 10 conditional
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probability problems delivered via a computer. The pilot study determined that a maximum
time of 60 minutes to complete the problems would be sufficient. Participants ended their
session with the post-test survey which was also delivered via computer. The post-test survey
contained 14 items based on the TAM (Davis, 1989) ease of use and perceived usefulness
survey instrument and three questions related to perceptions of confidence. Appendix A
contains example of the background information survey, the spatial ability test, the post-test
survey of satisfaction. Appendix G contains details on each of the ten conditional probability
problems. At no time did this study store or retain any personally identifiable code, marker or
other personally identifiable data. Participants in the study were recruited with an incentive to
possibly receive one of two Apple iPad devices that were chosen by lottery. A lab study
supervisor performed recruiting and kept all information related to participants involved in
the raffle separate from the study data and unavailable to the principal investigator.
While answering the suite of 10 problems, participants were allowed to use Microsoft
Windows Calculator program to perform math calculations but were not able to use any other
materials, devices or software. In order to ensure there were no biases resulting from the
order of appearance for problems or elements, all problems were presented in random order.
The high complexity diagram contains two primary Euler circles that were also presented in
random order (left versus right circle first). Participants had 60 minutes to complete the 10
problems and all participants completed them within the allotted time.
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CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
After concluding the data collection process, the data were evaluated to identify any
errors in recording or software issues causing data quality. None were found and the software
was reliable in recording data. The data was then prepared for further univariate and
multivariate analysis.

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The data related to participants, performance and satisfaction were collected and
analyzed. The cell counts, means, and standard deviations for the depended and covariate
were calculated.

Participants
A total of 158 participants were included in the study. In order to have a more diverse
set of participants, this study recruited students, staff and faculty from across the university
community. Approximately one-third of the participants (57) were older than 22 and 28 of the
participants were not in college. All participant characteristics are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3. Participant demographics
Demographic characteristics
Gender
Male
Female
Language
Native English Speakers
Non-Native English Speakers
Age
18-22 years old
23-34 years old
35-44 years old
45-54 years old
55-67
Highest educational
High School
background
Undergraduate
Graduate
Ph.D.
Degree in progress
None
High school
Undergraduate
Graduate
Ph.D.
Probability skills
1 – No skill
2
3
4
5
6
7 – Expert
Probability experience
Yes
No
Visually impaired
Yes
No

Count
83
75
143
15
101
30
8
10
9
108
32
16
2
28
7
110
7
6
17
28
37
41
31
4
0
105
53
16
142

To test for the influence of participant background on performance, a regression
analysis was completed on age, English as a second language, gender, self-reported
experience and skill with probabilities, current educational level in progress and educational
level attained and visual impairment. None of these variables were found to be significantly
or marginally associated with performance (Appendix F). Participants were randomly
assigned a treatment, resulting in an unbalanced, between-subjects design. The assignment of
participants to treatments is listed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Sample sizes
Complexity

Display Type
Diagram
Text

Total

Complex
Simple

40
44

37
37

77
81

Total

84

74

158
Spatial ability

Spatial ability was measured by the paper folding text (see Appendix B). This test has
a minimum possible score of 0 and a maximum possible score of 20. Scoring for this test is
the sum of all correct answers less the total of answers marked incorrect divided by four. For
each marked (versus blank) incorrect answers, participants are deducted ¼ point. To support
further analysis and visualization of the interaction effect, a post-hoc category representing
spatial ability was created. A median split of the VZ-2 scores was used to divide the
participants into two categories: high spatial ability (N=78) and low spatial ability (N=80).
This blocking factor was used in post-hoc analysis. In this study, the participants’ mean score
was 10.24 and the median score was 10.5. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for spatial
ability (VZ-2).
Table 5. Spatial ability score descriptive statistics
Statistic
Mean
Median
Standard deviation
Minimum score
Maximum score
High spatial average (n=78)
Low spatial average (n=80)
Shapiro-Wilk test for normality

Measure
10.24
10.50
4.19
0.25
20.00
13.71
6.86
W=.986, p=.12

Performance descriptive statistics
The means for performance and satisfaction (perceived ease of use and perceived
usefulness) were calculated. For performance, the simple text display had the highest mean of
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7.41, followed by the simple diagram display (6.39), complex diagram display (5.38) and
complex text with the lowest mean score (3.32). Table 6 lists the means and standard
deviations for performance for each display type. Figure 4 depicts these means.
Table 6. Correct means
Display Type
Complexity

Diagram
M

Complex
Simple

5.38
6.39

Text

SD

M

2.62
3.60

3.32
7.41

SD
2.00
3.13

Figure 4. Means for Correct.

Satisfaction descriptive statistics
User satisfaction was measured by a post-test survey derived from the Davis (1989)
technology acceptance model (TAM). Perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness are two
determinants of users’ intentions to adopt technology. In the survey, seven questions
measured perceived ease of use and six questions measured perceived usefulness. To
establish discriminant and convergent validity of the two determinants, a rotated factor
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analysis was performed. One question from the perceived ease of construct and two questions
from the perceived usefulness construct were dropped due to low factor loadings (see
Appendix E). Cronbach’s α values were calculated to check the reliability of the instrument
and constructs. Perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness had high Cronbach’s α values
(.90 and .92 respectively) indicating the survey was reliable. The means for perceived ease of
use and perceived usefulness are shown in Tables 7 and 8 and in Figure 5.
Table 7. Perceived ease of use means
Display Type
Complexity

Diagram
M

Complex
Simple

5.66
5.30

SD
1.21
1.47

Text
M

SD

5.09
5.59

1.30
1.35

Table 8. Perceived usefulness means
Display Type
Complexity

Diagram
M

Complex
Simple

4.81
4.86

SD
1.42
1.53

Text
M
4.08
4.67

SD
1.29
1.36
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Figure 5. Means for satisfaction
7.00
5.66

6.00
5.09

4.81

5.00
4.00

5.59

5.30
4.67

4.86

4.08
Ease of use

3.00

Usefulness

2.00
1.00
0.00
6T

6D

3T

3D

HYPOTHESIS TESTS REQUIRED
To test the hypotheses for this study, a series of ANCOVA/ANOVA analyses were
done followed by a series of one-tailed pairwise comparisons between displays. Since spatial
ability is expected to impact performance, an ANCOVA analysis was conducted to analyze
performance. For satisfaction, an ANOVA analysis was conducted for perceived ease of use
and perceived usefulness. An ANOVA was performed for satisfaction because the literature
review did not indicate an interaction between spatial ability and satisfaction nor was one
hypothesized or planned for this study.

Performance analysis of covariance
Since the hypotheses called for the examination of two main effects (complexity and
for display type), a two-way ANCOVA was conducted. The results of that ANCOVA are
shown in Table 9.
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Table 9. ANCOVA for Performance
Source
Model

DF

SS

MS

F

6

680.77

113.46

Error

151

981.09

6.50

Corrected total

157

1661.85

Display type

1

11.47

Complexity

1

Spatial_ability (covariate)

Pr > F

17.46

<.0001

11.47

1.76

.1860

236.97

236.97

36.47

<.0001

1

276.10

276.10

42.50

<.0001

Complexity*Display type

1

62.53

62.53

9.62

.0023

Display type*Spatial ability

1

75.93

75.93

11.60

.0008

Complexity*Spatial ability

1

18.30

18.30

2.82

.0953

The overall analysis of covariance showed that complexity and spatial ability affected
performance (F(6,151) = 17.46, p<.0001, η2=.41), but also identified a significant interaction
between complexity and display type (F(1)=9.62, p=.0023), and between spatial ability and
display_type (F(1) = 11.60, p=.0008). The display type main effect was not a significant
effect in the ANCOVA analysis, nor was the interaction between complexity and spatial
ability. For display type, overall participants did not perform better with diagrams than with
text displays (M=5.91 versus M=5.36, t(151)=1.30, p=.1970). For complexity, overall
participants performed better with simpler diagrams than with complex diagrams (M=6.95
versus M=4.39, t(151)=6.23, p<=.0001, Cohen’s d=1.01). Details on the interaction between
spatial ability and display type and complexity and display type are discussed further in this
chapter.
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Satisfaction analysis of variance
The ANOVA for perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use are shown in Tables
10 and 11. The overall ANOVA models for both variables were not significant. No
differences between the treatment means for perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness
could be identified. Users did not perceive diagram displays as significantly easier to use or
significantly more useful than text displays. Likewise, users did not significantly perceive
simple displays as easier to use or more useful than complex displays.
Table 10. Perceived ease of use ANOVA results
Source

DF

Model

SS

MS

F

3

7.89

2.63

Error

154

276.68

1.80

Corrected total

157

284.58

Display type

1

0.73

Complexity

1

Complexity*Display type

1

Pr > F

1.46

.2264

0.73

0.41

.5421

0.23

0.23

0.13

.7223

7.15

7.15

3.98

.0478

Table 11. Perceived usefulness ANOVA results
Source
Model

DF

SS

MS

F

3

15.02

5.01

Error

154

306.41

1.99

Corrected total

157

321.42

Display type

1

8.37

Complexity

1

Complexity*Display type

1

Pr > F

2.45

.0604

8.37

4.21

.0419

4.07

4.07

2.05

.1546

2.92

2.91

1.47

.2273
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HYPOTHESES SUMMARY
The test of the four hypotheses could require up to 12 one-tailed comparisons.
Hypothesis 1, that diagrams are superior to text displays for performance, requires two onetailed t-tests between participants. The tests need to compare performance differences
between simple diagram and simple text displays (3D>3T) and between the complex diagram
and complex text displays (6D>6T). Looking at the first hypothesis, H1, participants in this
study demonstrated higher levels of performance with diagrams than with text for only the
high relational complexity (complex) treatments (5.38 versus 3.32 correct, t(75)=3.84,
p=.0002, Cohen’s d=.87). Participants did not demonstrated better performance with
diagrams than with text in the low relational complexity (simple) condition (6.39 versus 7.41
correct, t(79)=-1.35, p=.9090). Thus H1 is partially confirmed.
Hypothesis 2, that diagrams are superior to text displays for satisfaction, requires four
one-tailed t-tests. Satisfaction is comprised of two factors, perceived ease of use and
perceived usefulness. Both variables representing these factors require comparisons across
both levels of complexity. This results in the same comparisons as required for performance,
but for each of the two satisfaction sub-factors: simple diagrams are superior to simple text
displays (3D>3T) and complex diagrams are superior to complex text displays (6D>6T).
Since the ANOVA for satisfaction and ease of use failed to detect significant differences,
pairwise t-tests were not conducted. H2 is not supported.
Hypothesis 3, that low relational complexity displays are superior to high relational
complexity displays, requires two one-tailed t-tests between participants. The tests need to
compare performance differences between simple diagram and complex diagram displays
(3D>6D) and between the simple text and complex text displays (6D>6T). Looking at the
third hypothesis (H3), participants demonstrated better performance with low relational
complexity (simple) displays over high relational complexity (complex) displays for only the
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text treatments (7.41 versus 3.32 correct, t(72)=6.68, p<.0001, Cohen’s d=1.55.) Participants
did not demonstrate improved performance with simple displays than with complex for the
diagram treatments (6.39 versus 5.38 correct, t(82)=1.46, p=.0712). Thus H3 is partially
confirmed.
Hypothesis 4, that diagrams are superior to text displays for satisfaction, requires four
one-tailed t-tests. Satisfaction is comprised of two factors, perceived ease of use and
perceived usefulness. Both variables representing these factors require comparisons across
both types of displays. This results in the same comparisons as required for performance:
simple diagram displays are superior to complex diagram displays (3D>6D) and simple text
displays are superior to complex text displays (3T>6T). Since the ANOVA for satisfaction
and ease of use failed to detect significant differences, pairwise t-tests were not conducted.
H4 is not supported.
In reviewing the original hypotheses, this study partially confirms the hypotheses for
performance but does not confirm the hypotheses related to satisfaction. Table 12 lists the
performance hypotheses, the variable tested, the means, the resulting p test, and the effect
size as measured by the Cohen’s d statistic.
Table 12. Hypotheses t-tests for performance
M

SD

M

SD

t-test

Cohen’s d

H1 - Diagrams > Text: performance
Correct
3D>3T
6D>6T

6.39
5.38

3.60
2.62

7.41
3.32

3.13
2.00

-1.35
3.84 ***

.89

3.60
3.13

5.38
3.32

2.62
2.00

1.48
6.68 ***

1.55

H3: Low RC > High RC: performance
Correct
3D>6D
3T>6T

6.39
7.41

***p ≤ .001. All tests are one-tailed.
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H1 was partially supported. In the complex condition, diagrams improved
performance compared with text. In the simple condition, diagrams did not help. H3 was
partially supported. Simple text displays performed better than complex text displays. Simple
diagrams did not perform better than simple text. Table 13 summarizes the hypothesis
findings in data that partially support the four hypotheses.
Table 13. Hypotheses summary
Measure

Test

Conclusion

Conditions

H1:

Performance

Diagram>Text

Partially supported

High RC: yes

Low RC: no

H2:

Satisfaction

Diagram>Text

Not supported

High RC: no

Low RC: no

H3:

Performance

Low RC > High RC

Partially supported

Text: yes

Diagram: no

H4:

Satisfaction

Low RC> High RC

Not supported

Text: no

Diagram: no

The summary of the hypotheses t-tests (Table 12) and the depiction of performance
means for performance (Figure 3) indicate that the less complex diagram display (3D) is
failing to improve performance sufficiently. However, the ANCOVA results show a
significant interaction effect between spatial ability (VZ-2) and the diagram display.
Additional post-hoc analysis was conducted to understand the nature of this interaction.

SPATIAL ABILITY INTERACTION WITH DIAGRAM DISPLAYS
To understand the effect of spatial ability on diagrams, it is helpful to see a
comparison of means by spatial ability. A median split of the spatial ability scores as a posthoc classification illustrates the interaction (Figures 7 and 8). Figure 4 also approximates the
plot of the slopes of the regression lines for each treatment in the ANCOVA analysis for
performance.
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Figure 6. Comparison of low- and high-spatial performance

Figure 7. Comparison of low- and high-spatial performance

From Figures and 6 and 7, the diminished performance of the simple and complex
diagram for low-spatial users becomes noticeable. Using the median split of spatial ability
(VZ-2) as a method of differentiating high- and low-spatial users, two-tailed pairwise ttesting was conducted to verify the significance of the difference between high- and low-
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spatial user performance for all displays. While performing a median split can reduce the
overall power of the analysis by as much as 38-60% (Cohen, 1983), the effect size of spatial
ability is large and additional results presented here can be considered very conservative.
Low spatial participants performed 51% worse (4.14 versus 8.43, N=21 and 23
respectively) on the simple diagram and 28% worse (4.44 versus 6.24, N=19 and 21
respectively) on the complex diagram than the high spatial participants. Two-tailed t-tests
confirmed this finding for both the simple diagram (3D) displays (t(42)=4.79, p<.0001,
Cohen’s d=1.46) and the complex diagram (6D) displays (t(38)=2.31, p<.0264, Cohen’s
d=.74). Also of note, low-spatial and high spatial participants did not differ in their
performance on either the simple or the complex text-only versions of the problem (p=.5662
and p=.9267 respectively). The diagram displays significantly impaired low-spatial
participants’ performance. The text displays performed equally well for high- and low-spatial
participants. Table 14 summarizes the high- and low spatial comparisons of performance.
Table 14. Spatial ability split comparisons by treatment

Simple diagram
Simple text
Complex diagram
Complex text
*p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .001

High spatial

Low spatial

M

M

8.43
7.45
6.24
3.57

SD
2.11
2.99
2.51
1.99

4.14
7.35
4.42
3.17

SD
3.58
3.37
2.46
2.04

t-test
4.79 ***
0.09
2.31 *
0.58

Cohen’s d
1.46
.74

Low-spatial user performance was diminished with diagram displays, especially the
simple diagram display. This contributed to the interaction effect between display type and
complexity. Diagram displays significantly impeded low-spatial performance. High spatial
users can process diagrams for conditional probability problems in non-learning contexts.
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Across the collection of ten conditional probability problems used in this study,
people do better with diagrams when the problem is more complex and do better with few
interacting elements in the problem when it is presented in a text-only display. Since this
study used a collection of conditional probability problems that varied different problem
features (prevalence, specificity, sensitivity rates, class size, and number of words), these
findings are more generalizable than other studies that relied on a single problem (e.g., Brase,
2008). This study’s findings also affirm relational complexity theory and mental model
theory as promising approaches for guiding the design of visual displays for improving user
performance in conditional probability problems. For high-spatial users, this study’s findings
also provide additional evidence that theories of working memory and graph comprehension
can be applied to the construction of displays for conditional probability problems. However,
the observation of an interaction effect between spatial ability and diagram displays paints a
more complicated picture. Because of this interaction effect, this study’s performance
hypotheses were only partially confirmed. In order to improve performance uniformly across
all users, one has to consider individual differences in spatial ability. What could be argued as
a display that would be the most helpful (the simple diagram display), was found to
significantly impede performance for users with less spatial working memory.

DIAGRAMS AND SPATIAL ABILITY
The relationship between spatial ability and user processing of diagram displays
complicates matters for designers of systems. Why is there a degraded performance for lowspatial users? The theoretical models discussed in Chapter 2 provide an explanation.
Diagrams are more likely to prevent correct mental model construction for people with less
spatial working memory. As theories of working memory (Miyake & Shah, 1999; Baddeley,
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2010) and mental models (Knauff, 2009) indicate, since spatial working memory is used to
process the diagram displays and build a mental model, low-spatial users were noticeably
impaired in constructing the mental model while processing the diagram display.
Based on the literature reviewed, solving these problems requires people to construct
a mental model of the problem in their mind. Mental models, being spatial in nature, require
the use of spatial working memory (among other working memory components). For those
with less spatial memory, the use of a diagram creates additional demands on spatial working
memory to process the visual diagram, impairing performance. The findings from this study
seem to indicate that spatial working memory underlies the visuospatial sketchpad and
contributes to not only processing visual information, but mental model construction. In
addition, spatial working memory contributes to math computation (Trbovich & LeFevre,
2003; Zago & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2002; Houdé, & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2003). All three of these
tasks (visual processing, math computation and mental model construction) are present in the
conditional probability problems used in this study. Here, Baddeley’s (1999) and Logie’s
(2011) account of the inner scribe component of the VSSP, which handles spatial
relationships for visual and nonvisual content, aligns with the mental models account
(Knauff, 2009) of the spatial nature of reasoning problems. In addition to its contributions to
processing relations between visual objects, this amodel nature of the inner scribe might be
used to also help construct mental models in reasoning problems generally and specifically in
the conditional probability problems used here.
For low-spatial users, the diagram displays could be creating a disruption in more
limited spatial working memory needed for mental model construction. The diagram displays
may be exposing this dual role for the inner scribe portion of the VSSP. Because spatial
working memory is strongly associated with executive control (Hegarty & Waller, 2005;
Miyaki et al., 2001) and neurological mental models data shows tight integration between
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central executive and spatial processing capabilities in the brain (Knauff, 2009), low-spatial
user performance problems with diagrams could be related to difficulty with central executive
control, not just spatial working memory capacity limitations. Both Logie (2011) and
Baddeley (1999, 2012) acknowledge the inner scribe’s role in providing spatial processing for
visual and non-visual inputs. Knauf (2009) argues forcefully for the role of amodal spatial
working memory served by the posterior parietal cortex in reasoning processes. No research
identified to date has investigated the potential conflict possible within tasks that have
external representations that require spatial visual processing (diagrams) and reasoning
processes that require construction and validation of mental models using spatial working
memory (inherent in conditional probability problems).
How can low-spatial users’ spatial working memory get disrupted by a visual?
Cognitive processes can occur in a top-down fashion, guided by attention control
mechanisms and goal-processing or in a bottom-up fashion driven by visual stimuli (Beck &
Kastner, 2009; Knauff, 2009). Moreover, representation in the visual system is competitive
with bottom-up and top-down cognitive processes influencing the neural competition (Beck
& Kastner, 2009). Processing in perception starts in the retina and then proceeds to the
occipital cortex, with follow-on processing by the dorsal (“where”) and ventral (“what”)
streams in different parts of the brain. This bottom-up process responds to and is guided by
perceptual processes that start with the eye. Bottom-up processing occurs before top-down
processing (Van der Stigchel, et al., 2009). Visual processing can also work top-down, in
which visual images in memory or guided by reasoning processes can evoke a pattern of
neural activity that involve regions of the brain that overlap perceptual processing. Both
bottom-up and top-down processes interact with each other as visual processing occurs, with
top-down modulation of attention occurring in proportion that bottom-up processes have not
resolved the salience of visual objects (McCains & Kastner, 2011). In other words, to the
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degree that bottom-up processing cannot automatically clarify visual elements, top-down
processing focuses attention on the necessary visual elements.
In this study, participants’ mental model construction was most likely guided by goaloriented, top-down, cognitive processes along with more automatic, perceptual bottom-up
processes attending to the diagram display. These bottom-up processes can trigger
formulation of incorrect mental models based on input from the retina and corresponding
activity from the visual cortex to working memory. In this mode of presentation, the act of
perceiving the diagram through more automatic, bottom-up cognitive processes could have
severely impaired the low-spatial users’ ability to build the appropriate mental model. Lowspatial users may be less able to inhibit or restrict bottom-up processing, thus causing visual
diagram processing to conflict with spatial working memory needed to construct and validate
a correct mental model.
Knauff’s (2009) account is of interest. It contends, based on neuroimaging studies of
reasoning, that mental model processing critically involves two brain regions, the posterior
parietal cortex (PPC) and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The former is for
maintenance and handling of amodal spatial information (the mental model) and the latter is
for controlling the inspection and manipulation of the model. The PPC is also part of the
dorsal “where” processing pathway that processes visual information. The prefrontal cortex is
strongly associated with central executive processing (Knauff, 2009). Following this account,
if individual differences in central executive functioning are the cause of low-spatial user
impairment in the simple diagram condition, it is likely that low-spatial user performance
with text-only displays would also be impaired. However, since the diagram display is the
source of the impairment for low-spatial users, not text-only displays, it is reasonable to infer
that amodal spatial working memory is overburdened for low-spatial users. Perhaps bottomup perceptual processes invite spatial working memory activity to process the Venn diagram,
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preventing appropriate top-down mental model maintenance and construction for low-spatial
users. If bottom-up perceptual processes initiated by diagram processing are inviting a kind of
dual-task interference with mental model construction, this would be similar to other studies
that have identified conflicts between visual representations of perceived stimuli and
mentally generated ones (Zimmer et al., 2010).
Since spatial ability is also associated with other intelligence measures (Hegarty &
Waller, 2005; Miyaki et al., 2001), one might also expect that low-spatial participants would
have reduced performance on the text-only version of the problem due to presumed deficits in
other non-visual cognitive capacities. However, this study found no significant differences in
performance between high- and low-spatial users on text-only displays. A possible
explanation is that the text-only displays facilitated problem solving reasonably well by using
natural frequencies, freeing up spatial working memory similarly for both high and lowspatial users. While both high and low-spatial users scored worse on complex text-only
problems compared with simple one, there were no significant differences between the highand low-spatial groups for either the simple or complex text-only displays. Only when the
visual was presented to the low spatial group was performance and presumably spatial
working memory capacity impacted. Since this study relied exclusively on the computer
presentation of each problem by not allowing any secondary tools such as notepaper to
interact with, participants had no choice but to interact with the computer display to solve the
problem. This study identified two sources of working memory constraints: 1) a capacity
limit constraint predicted by relational complexity and 2) possible a controlled attention
constraint induced by diagrams and especially simple diagrams that affects low-working
memory users by inhibiting the appropriate top-down control over the reasoning process.
While this study points to capacity limits in working memory as indicated by relational
complexity theory as the cause of the variation in user performance, it also points to the
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interaction between bottom-up visual processes and top-down attentional control processes
impairing low-spatial users when a diagram is used. Two related but different working
mechanisms may be involved. An alternative explanation is that other tests of cognitive
ability (such as need for cognition test or the cognitive reflection test) that are different from
tests of spatial ability other related cognitive measures, may be better predictors of text-only
performance (Toplak, et al., 2011).
Do the kinds of errors that users made support this explanation? In reviewing
incorrect answers across all four treatments, it was possible to unambiguously categorize
some, but not all, of the errors. For simple problems, participants can select up to four
possible sets and for the complex problems participants can select up to seven. In addition,
for the simple problems, participants can infer some of the ‘hidden’ sets by subtracting two
sets from each other. For example, in the simple version of the Blue Cab problem,
participants can easily infer that of the 100 cabs tested, for which 29 were identified as Blue,
71 were not identified as Blue. Participant can make predictable errors by using (or inferring)
incorrect sets or relating them together incorrectly. Across all errors made, 53% could be
classified as set identification and set relationship errors. These errors are consistent with the
notion that people sometimes fail to properly identify the sets, infer the proper relationships
between the sets and then carry out the mathematical operations consistent with the
relationships. This indicates that the process of identifying and relating possible sets, which is
part of the processes for constructing and verifying the mental model, may be undergoing
degradation under complexity in general and under the diagram displays for low-spatial
users.
Considering the three component model of working memory of Baddeley (2007)
which includes a central executive, the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop,
there may be another plausible explanation. Low spatial users may be suffering from an
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attention distraction effect, especially with the simple condition. In this condition, an
intervening question was placed in between presentation of the first two sets and the final set
(Figure 2) in order to control relational complexity. This extra step may have been like a
“speed bump.” In the simple diagram condition, low spatial users may not be able to
effectively manage the coordination of verbal and visual working memory resources across
the visual and verbal modes with this intervening question while simultaneously constructing
a mental model. This represents a dual-task conflict. In this case the two tasks are processing
the visual and building a mental model of the problem. Most designers do not normally think
that presenting a simple diagrammatic visual with text introduces a dual-task conflict. It is
quite possible that a similar impairment may be occurring in the use of Venn and Euler-type
diagrams used more broadly across other related problems such as relational and syllogistic
reasoning which may use working memory resources similarly (Knauff, 2009).
Low-spatial user performance with complex diagrams also deserves some discussion.
Unlike the simple diagram condition, in the complex condition, low spatial participants’
performance did not reverse under the presence of a visual. Instead it failed to improve
performance as much as it did for high spatial users. As been discussed elsewhere here,
spatial working memory has to serve two tasks: process the visual and build the mental
model. In the presence of a diagram (which consumes limited VSSP resources), low spatial
users may have less spatial working memory capacity than high-spatial users to build the
mental model and solve the problem. Automatic, bottom-up, visual processing induced by the
computer diagrams may consume low-spatial users’ working memory needed for building the
mental model. However, other working memory resources may be affecting performance.
Does spatial working memory reliance on top-down attention mechanisms (the central
executive) (Awh & Jonidas, 2001), cause a deficit in central executive coordination induced
by the visual? Or is it a failure to maintain the visual image or the mental model (or both) in
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spatial working memory due to excessive decay in time-limited buffers (Cowan, 2001)?
Future research is called for to clarify the mechanism underlying the performance
degradation which can, in turn, give guidance to designers.
High spatial participants performed best with the simple diagram with a mean of 8.43
correct. While this measure was not significant in its difference from the next best performing
treatment (simple text, mean=7.37) perhaps due to ceiling effects in which the most dominant
score, the mode, was 10 (13 out of 37 cases), the score is quite high when compared with
prior study scores of total correct (Brase, Cosmides & Tooby, 1998; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
1995). For high spatial users, simple diagram displays perform very well. The highest score in

all conditions for the low-spatial users was the simple text condition with 7.35 correct. Again
the most dominant answer and the mode for this group was 10 (13 out of 44 cases). These
scores, which were across a battery of ten problems that varied in several aspects (content,
sensitivity, specificity, prevalence, class size, and word length) should be fairly generalizable
to other types of conditional probability problems. Following the theories of working
memory and mental models discussed in this study, high-spatial users appear to have ample
VSSP capacity to both process the visual and construct a mental model to infer a correct
answer.
While other researchers exploring the use of visuals to enhance learning have noted a
spatial ability effect where improved multimedia displays favor those with high spatial ability
more than those with low (Mayer, 1997), the reasons for the improvement cited by Mayer
(1997) are related to dual-coding theory where visual and verbal codes together provide for
better recall than verbal codes alone. This study is a non-learning study and did not require
participants to encode any schemas into long-term memory. Since participants brought little if
anything from learned schemas such as the Bayesian algorithm for calculating conditional
probabilities to the problem solving process, the interaction of spatial ability with diagram
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displays is most likely confined to working memory. Nonetheless, the cognitive theory of
multimedia learning (CTML) guideline applies here as well. Diagrams benefit people with
higher spatial ability and hurt those with less.

SATISFACTION AND POTENTIAL ADOPTION ISSUES
The small range in satisfaction means between the four displays were most likely due
to the computer-generated displays that were designed to be relatively easy to use regardless
of the problem complexity. In the design of the displays, care was taken to apply the known
improvements for understandability, ease of computation and graphical display. This is
supported by the mean satisfaction scores for both satisfaction measures which were above
the midpoint of 4 which denotes neutral satisfaction. The means for the treatments ranged
from 4.08 to 5.66 out of a seven-point scale.
The finding that satisfaction scores were similar across all displays begs a more
difficult question. If users cannot perceive any differences in satisfaction between displays
that hurt their performance from those that help, how will displays be used in situations of
voluntary adoption, where users are free to choose whatever display they perceive to be best?
If users’ perceptions of satisfaction cannot guide them into the appropriate display, users may
voluntarily, and unknowingly, choose a display that hurts their performance. For example,
low-spatial users may be inclined to adopt simple diagram (3D) displays, unaware of the
diagram’s negative effect on their performance. Future research may help shed light on the
relationship, if any, between satisfaction and adoption of computer displays for conditional
probability problems.

COGNITIVE EFFORT AND PERFORMANCE
To further examine reasons why low-spatial users had difficulty with the simpler
diagram display, this study examined two questions contained within the satisfaction survey
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that were relevant to perceptions of cognitive effort (Paas, 1992). These two questions were
part of the TAM satisfaction survey (see Appendix B) and were asked of all 158 participants.
These questions might be helpful in shedding light on whether or not low-spatial participants
had more difficulty with the simple diagram (3D) display because of increased cognitive
load. These two questions on the survey are relevant to perceptions of cognitive effort:
1. The comprehension task on this presentation required less mental effort.
2. I felt frustrated when performing the tasks for these problems.
These two questions were not included into the final two factors (perceived ease of
use and perceived usefulness) that comprise satisfaction because of low loadings but did form
a factor on their own. A full set of data was available for these two questions. All responses to
these two questions were rated just as the other TAM questions were – on a seven point scale.
The responses to these two questions were combined and analyzed to see if the low-spatial
participants did report any increased difficulty with the diagram displays compared with their
high-spatial counterparts. An post-hoc two-way ANOVA (with main effects of complexity
and display type) of this measure was highly significant (F(3,154)=15.38, p<.0001, η2=.23),
with two highly significant effects for complexity and display type (p<.0001 and p=.0012
respectively) indicating the overall model is valid.
In the simple diagram condition (3D), low-spatial participants did report more
difficulty than high spatial participants. Two-tailed tests confirmed the finding (4.43 versus
5.52, t(42)=3.03, p=.0041, Cohen’s d=.92). However, in the complex diagram condition, lowspatial participants did not report more difficulty than high spatial participants (3.97 versus
4.74, t(38)=1.81, p=.0781, Cohen’s d=.57). Low-spatial and high spatial participants were
also indistinguishable in their reporting of difficulty with the simple text condition (4.74
versus 4.93, t(37)=0.37, p=.7121) and the complex text condition (3.22 versus 3.18,
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t(35)=0.10, p=.9232). The additional difficulty low-spatial participants expressed beyond
what their high spatial counterparts expressed was reserved for the simple diagram displays
only.
When combining both low spatial and high spatial participants together, participant
perceptions of difficulty as measured with the two questions above differed as expected,
depending on the overall treatment performance. Two-tailed tests confirmed that overall,
participants rated complex diagrams as more difficult than simple diagrams (4.38 versus 5.00,
t(82)=2.14, p=.0352, Cohen’s d=.47) and complex text as more difficult than simple text
(3.20 versus 4.85, t(72)=5.77,p<.0001, Cohen’s d=1.36). Also, participants rated complex text
as more difficult than complex diagrams (4.38 versus 3.20, t(75)=4.03, p=.0001, Cohen’s
d=.93). This confirms that users reported less cognitive effort for simple diagrams compared
with complex ones and less cognitive effort for simple text compared with complex text.
However, most likely due to the interaction effect between spatial ability and diagram
displays, when pooled together, participants did not rate simple diagrams as easier than
simple text.
Interestingly, while low-spatial users rated simple diagrams as more difficult than
their high-spatial counterparts, neither the low-spatial nor high spatial groups differed among
themselves in perceptions of difficulty between simple diagrams and simple text displays.
Within each group, the difficulty of simple diagram and simple text displays were rated
similarly. While between-group differences exist, none do within the groups. Low spatial
users expressed more effort than their high spatial counterparts with the simple diagram
display, but they did not report any difference in effort among themselves between the simple
text and simple diagram displays. In other words, the low-spatial users were unaware of any
increased cognitive effort for the low-spatial diagram. An analysis of the total time required
to complete the problems revealed no significant differences between any of the displays, or
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between high- and low-spatial users for each display. If the time it took the user to complete
problems is indicative of increased effort, users did not exhibit any differences in the total
time they took.
This has two implications. First, since perceptions of difficulty for low spatial users
are the same for simple text and simple diagrams, rather than increasing cognitive load for
those users, the simple diagram display may have over-facilitated the problem while still
conflicting with spatial working memory, leading low-spatial users to easily select incorrect
elements. This also suggests that users are largely unaware that bottom-up visual processes
may be leading them astray. Working memory capacity may be related to central executive
processing (Zimmer, et al., 2010). Individuals may differ in their ability to control attention
and inhibit the processing irrelevant information (Zimmer et al., 2010, Oberauer et al., 2007,
Feldman Barrett et al., 2004). Low spatial users may have had difficulty in effectively
suppressing irrelevant information, especially in the presence of displays that facilitate
performance like the 3D displays. While user performance was impaired in the simple
diagram (3D) display, participant perceptions of effort did not detect the impairment. In the
interaction between bottom-up and top-down cognitive processes, it might be possible that
low- and high spatial users differed in their ability to suppress errant over-facilitation caused
by more automatic bottom up processes. Low-working memory users may have a similar
capacity for processing elements as do high working memory users, explaining their similar
performance with text-only displays, but may have an inability to control attention in the
presence of “seductive details” in visual displays (Sanchez & Wiley, 2006), and “trip up” in
their answers. Low spatial users may benefit from a more complex diagram in order to
prevent this over-facilitation. Again, future research is needed to clarify this point.
Second, this lack of a difference in perceptions of effort between displays within lowand high-spatial groups may have display adoption implications if cognitive effort proves to
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be a contributor to adoption of technology (Schmutz, et al., 2009) for these kinds of
problems. If low- and high-spatial users perceive displays that compromise their performance
similarly to displays that aid their performance, adoption of the wrong displays might be
more likely to occur. While this study did not hypothesize effects of cognitive effort, future
research may find perceptions of cognitive load might prove more useful and appropriate
measures to predict adoption than satisfaction. While the two questions that comprise
cognitive effort in this study are derived from a TAM satisfaction survey, they are similar to
questions that describe cognitive effort. However, satisfaction and cognitive effort are
different concepts. More robust measures of cognitive effort may be helpful in rating user
perceptions of the displays for conditional probabilities that can be used to predict technology
adoption. In this regard, future studies may help.

SUMMARY OF WORKING MEMORY IMPLICATIONS AND THE DIAGRAM DISPLAYS
Considering the initial three component model of working memory (Baddeley, 2012),
users need to coordinate visual and verbal information in the diagram displays (Figure 8).
The verbal information is held in the phonological loop and the visual information in the
visuospatial sketchpad. The VSSP is comprised of two components that process object and
spatial properties. Low-spatial working memory users may have less ability to suppress
automatic bottom-up processing, especially if the visual image has high saliency, that is, is
easily distinguished and contains few elements competing for attention. Simple diagram
displays probably have higher saliency. This working memory difference in the ability to
suppress bottom-up visual information may prevent low-spatial users from exerting more topdown effort on interpreting the problem features. In addition, the spatial properties in the
diagram conditions may be consuming spatial working memory which is also used to build
the mental model. In both cases, errant mental models are constructed more frequently in the
diagram displays for low-spatial users and especially the simple diagram display.
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Figure 8. Working memory model

LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
A limitation of this study is that it did not include more robust measures of cognitive
effort. Future studies might be benefit from using self-reports of cognitive effort such as the
mental effort rating scale (Paas et al., 2003) to augment the technology adoption framework
(Davis, 1989). For these types of problems, surveys of cognitive effort may be helpful for
understanding user adoption behavior. In addition, in order to keep this study manageable,
this study was not able to control other factors, such as testing the elimination of the “speed
bump” in the simple diagram and text displays and testing out other visual treatments instead
of diagrams like the iconic displays used in the Brase (2008) study.
The simple diagram and text conditions may have a ceiling effect. Since these
displays, especially the diagram display for the high-spatial users, had a skewed distribution
with 10 out of 10 correct as the most dominant score. Future studies that wish to test working
memory limits may need to determine an optimal problem construction to avoid ceiling
effects.
- 87 -

DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
As the goal of this study was to help users with conditional probability problems in
everyday, non-learning contexts, the designers of the user interface will need to take into
account individual differences in spatial ability. Based on the findings, this study
recommends the following guidelines:
1. Reduce relational complexity. With the exception of the simple diagram display
for low-spatial users, simpler problems helped users produce more correct
answers.
2. For low-spatial users, use simpler, text-only displays. These displays will facilitate
performance better than diagrams will.
3. For high-spatial users, Venn and Euler-type diagrams can be safely used and can
improve performance.
4. Use natural frequencies. All of the problems used in this study used natural
frequencies and the best performing treatment, the simpler text-only displays, had
a mean of 7.51 out of 10 correct. This is much higher than other studies
performance measures.
5. If all components of the conditional probability problem must be displayed at once
(e.g., the full contingency table representation), the diagrammatic display will
provide the best performance overall.
6. If spatial ability measures are available for the target audience, designers can
personalize the display based on spatial working memory capacity. Simpler
diagram displays can be used with high-spatial users and simpler text-only
displays can be used with low-spatial users.
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Additional studies will need to be conducted in order to identify other design
considerations, such as whether the intermediate step (with a question) in the simpler
treatments used in this study) helps or hurts user performance while considering spatial
ability; whether displays other than Venn and Euler-type diagrams might help (iconic
displays, animation sequences, etc.); or whether low-spatial users need additional cognitive
load when using diagrams.

IMPLICATIONS
The implications from this study are significant and broad. Manipulations of relational
complexity and the use of Venn and Euler-type diagrams can aid in solving conditional
probability problems. However, since low-spatial participants are impaired with the use of
simple diagrams, and since this may be counterintuitive for many designers, it is likely that
most use of simpler diagrams with less relational complexity may be adversely impacting
close to half of their audiences. Analysis of the data from this study estimates that about 43%
of the Venn diagram users (the low-spatial users who were negatively impacted in this study),
could be at risk. While some research has been critical of the use of Venn diagrams for these
problems (Brase, 2009) and some positive (Sloman, et al., 2003), none of the research has
systematically tested Venn-type diagrams across a battery of problems while looking at
working memory constraints.
Future research might fruitfully apply the theoretical models used for this study. With
regard to conditional probability problems, relational complexity matters. Since these
problems can be easily reduced into simpler forms with fewer potentially interacting
elements, designers would be advised to consider simpler displays, especially when the
audience for the displays cannot be easily dealt with individually. The extensive collection of
research into people’s performance in solving conditional probabilities and Bayesian
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reasoning has not yet applied concepts and frameworks from cognitive psychology like
relational complexity and working memory. In addition, the recent research into the neural
correlates of working memory and reasoning can provide linkages between the functional and
physical descriptions of the mind. These frameworks can be applied to improve our
understanding of user performance problems without having to refer to less testable
constructs such as ‘frequency coding in the mind’ posited by frequentist interpretations of
performance (Brase, 2009). Working memory, relational complexity, mental models and
graph comprehension theories can be fruitful approaches for teasing out prescriptive details
for improving problem performance with displays. While some prior research has looked at
iconic displays for improving user performance in learning conditional probabilities, none
have looked at the use of these displays from a graph comprehension, relational complexity
and working memory perspective. For example, future studies could examine the relationship
between relational complexity and the iconic displays previously found to help performance
on conditional probability problems (Brase, 2009; Sloman, et al., 2003). Are iconic displays
processed in working memory differently than diagrams? Such a study could identify
additional visual display properties that make a cognitive difference.
As this study shows, individual differences in spatial ability do matter. While the most
significant performance degradation with diagrams in this study was confined to low-spatial
users, presentations of more complex conditional probability problems could potentially
overwhelm high-spatial users as well. This would lead to a prediction that diagram displays
could compete for spatial working memory resources and impair performance for even high
spatial users, given a high level of complexity. This superior performance of text for lowspatial users in the face of high complexity might be more generalizable than this study.
Other reasoning problems, such as syllogistic reasoning, predicate logic, mathematical
reasoning or any problem-solving process in which numerous sets must be processed in
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parallel to determine relationships and appropriate inferences may also be impacted by
complexity and diagrams. Applying relational complexity theory, theories of working
memory, mental models theory and graph comprehension theory, as this study has, may be
promising means for determining the effectiveness of computer displays on user performance
for this and related problems.

Further improving real-world uses of diagrams
For automatically generated computer displays, like the ones used here, it would be
useful to capture the users’ spatial ability (or other cognitive factors) directly via a test of
cognitive ability or infer it from other sources so that an appropriate display can be rendered.
Based on graph comprehension research, it might be possible to correlate eye movements
with inability to process diagrams effectively and hence, infer spatial ability. Also, some
researchers have been developing simpler survey designs that can collect user preferences for
visuals that correlate with measures of spatial ability (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov 2009).
These techniques could be added to business intelligence and analytical software packages
typically used in industry so that displays can be tailored appropriately based on individual
differences in user spatial abilities.
For further improvement in solving these problems, other problem characteristics may
need to be manipulated. While attributes of the problems like relational complexity and
display type affected performance, other problem attributes may lurk that affect performance
as well. In this study, problem texts varied in their word length. Since solving these problems
involves reading and rereading text while processing sets, problems with longer word counts
and larger number of potential sets to process may be more difficult to solve. A post-hoc
repeated measures ANOVA test of the data in this study revealed that word count and number
of sets affects performance (word count x the number of sets to process). Problems with
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higher word and set counts more 18% more errors than problems with lower word and set
counts (F(1,150)=10.66, p=.0014). In addition, it is quite possible that lexical and syntactic
complexity measures (see Lu, 2010) can help predict users’ performance in these problems.
While language and visual working memory capabilities are normally conceptualized as
distinct and capable of independent processing, these working memory capabilities may be
highly correlated with other measures of intelligence (McFarland, 2012). Increased syntactic
complexity may increase working memory load (Fernandez-Duque, 2009). Therefore other
tests of problem complexity and mental capabilities may also provide additional predictive
capability. Lexical content may impede performance on some reasoning problems (Knauff &
Johnson-Laird, 2002). Controlling lexical content and lexical and syntactic complexity may
provide a fruitful path of inquiry for further improvement in user performance with these
problems.

SUMMARY
This study has further clarified how computer-generated diagrams can (or cannot) aid
in solving conditional probability problems. Across the suite of probability problems used in
this study, users did better with diagrams than with text when the problem was more complex
and did better with simple displays than complex ones when it was a text-only display.
Diagrams facilitate solving complex conditional probability problems. However, spatial
ability affects performance. Diagrams impede the reasoning ability for users with lower
spatial ability. Prior research may have overlooked the interaction effect between spatial
ability and reasoning. This interaction could be the source of some of the conflicting findings
in the studies on the facilitation of conditional problem solving with diagrams. More
importantly, in many everyday contexts where conditional probabilities are used and matter
greatly, such as the conveying of health risk information and explanation of statistical
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evidence in legal proceedings, designers of displays should be cognizant of how diagrams
help and hurt their audiences’ ability to understand and solve these problems.
This study sought to identify design guidelines to help interface designers in
constructing displays for conditional probability problems. The study found partial support
for the study hypotheses concerning user performance. Complex diagram displays are
superior in helping users generate correct answers than complex text displays and simple text
displays are better than complex text displays. The study identified a significant interaction
between users’ spatial ability and the use of diagrams in which low-spatial users were
impaired in their performance on simple diagrams compared with high-spatial users. The
impact of this finding is broad. Designers of systems that convey conditional probability
problems need to consider individual differences in spatial ability when using Venn and
Euler-type diagrams.
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APPENDIX A. BACKGROUND QUESTIONS
To be asked first at the beginning of the study.
Age: _____
Gender:  Male  Female
What is your highest educational background?
 High School
 Undergraduate
 Graduate School
If you have a degree in progress, what is it?
 None
 High School
 Undergraduate

 PhD

 Graduate School

 PhD

Concentration:________________________________
Is English your native language?

 Yes  No

Are you visually impaired?

 Yes  No

Have you had experience with probability theory or statistics?

 Yes  No

How would you describe your skill in probability theory or statistics?









No skill
skills






Expert
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APPENDIX B. SPATIAL ABILITY TEST
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APPENDIX C. SATISFACTION INSTRUMENT
After completion of all problems
1-I am confident that all my answers are correct.


Strongly
disagree











Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

2-I am unsure that the approach I took in solving these problems is correct.


Strongly
disagree











Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

3-I am confident that I will be able to solve problems like this in the future.


Strongly
disagree











Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

4-The presentation of these problems was useful for comprehension tasks.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

5-Learning to use this application was easy.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

6-The presentation of the problems enhanced the effectiveness of my comprehension.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

7-I have the knowledge and ability to use this application.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree
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Strongly
agree

8-The presentation of the problems made comprehension tasks easier.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

9-The presentation of the problems was clear and understandable.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

10-Remembering how to perform tasks was easy.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

11-I felt in control when using this application.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

12-The presentation of the problems helped me find answers quickly.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

13-It was easy to use this application.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

14-The comprehension task on this presentation required less mental effort.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

15-I felt frustrated when performing the tasks for these problems.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree


Strongly
agree

16-This presentation of the problems improved my understanding of the problems.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree
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Strongly
agree

17-In general, I am satisfied with the presentation of the problems.













Strongly
disagree

Disagree

Slightly
disagree

Neutral

Slightly
agree

Agree
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Strongly
agree

APPENDIX D. DATA ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS
Dependent variable analysis discovered some non-normal data with non-equal
variances (heteroskedasticity) that could not be adequately resolved with transformations.
However, sample sizes in each cell were large (>35) and all dependent variables had well
bounded variances due to the responses being limited to the Likert scales for the satisfaction
measure and the number correct (between 0 and 10). The distribution for correct, ease of use
and satisfaction are shown in Figures 9, 10 and 11). The residuals for correct were nonnormal and correct had non-equal variances. The residuals for perceived ease of use and
perceived usefulness were non-normally distributed, but both variables had equal variances.
Figure 9. Distribution of Correct.
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Figure 10. Distribution of satisfaction - perceived ease of use

Figure 11. Distribution of satisfaction – perceived usefulness
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ANCOVA ASSUMPTIONS
Since the covariate, spatial ability, was measured before the beginning of the
experiment, the covariate was measured independent of the treatments. Further analysis of the
variable correct, ease and perceived usefulness revealed that the distributions of residuals are
not normal and for correct, that the variances in all of the four conditions are not equal. These
heteroskedasticity and non-normality issues with correct could not be addressed with
conventional transformation and all analysis was conducted without transformation of
dependent. Table 15 shows the results of relevant the test statistic for each measure.
Table 15. Dependent measures of normality and heteroskedasticity
Variable
correct
perceived ease of use
perceived usefulness

Shapiro-Wilk test for
normality
W=.9742, p=.0047
W=.9199, p<.0001
W=.9638, p=.0004

Levene test for
heteroskedasticity
F(3)=5.84, p=.0008
F(3)=0.46, p=.7136
F(3)=0.59, p=.6235

T-TEST ASSUMPTIONS FOR PERFORMANCE AND SATISFACTION
For t-tests, wherever non-equal variances were encountered with correct, the
Satterthwaite approximate t test was used to report the t and the p values. Since sample sizes
were large, normality was dealt with as in the ANCOVA analysis and variables were not
transformed. The folded F statistic was used to compare variances in each of the t-tests. Table
16 lists the folded F statistic p value for each comparison used.
Table 16. Folded F Test for equality of variances p-values
Test
6D>6T
3D>3T
3D>6D
3T>6T

Correct
0.1062
0.3958
0.0469
0.0086

Ease
0.6747
0.5913
0.2168
0.8120

Useful
0.5382
0.4627
0.6377
0.7339

Difficulty
0.3213
0.9590
0.7400
0.5379

One comparison with non-equal variances had a significant difference in means
(3T>6T for correct). The significance of this comparison of these two conditions’ means was
p<.0001.
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APPENDIX E. VALIDATION OF THE SATISFACTION INSTRUMENT
The satisfaction survey (see Appendix A) was analyzed to determine its reliability.
1. Factor Analysis
(Questions 6, 11, 12 and 14 were dropped because of their low loadings.)
Factor 1
Factor 2
Item
(Perceived Usefulness)
(Perceived Ease of Use)
Communality
Question 1
0.72
0.67
Question 2
0.84
0.77
Question 3
0.87
0.83
Question 4
0.82
0.75
Question 5
0.82
0.80
Question 7
0.55
0.71
Question 8
0.80
0.80
Question 9
0.76
0.83
Question 10
0.77
0.70
Question 13
0.80
0.71
2. Internal Consistency of the Instrument
Variable
Perceived usefulness
Perceived ease of use

Number of Items
5: Q1,Q3,Q5,Q9,Q13
5: Q2,Q4,Q7,Q8,Q10

- 116 -

Cronbach’s α Value
0.92
0.90

APPENDIX F. BACKGROUND INFLUENCE ON PERFORMANCE
Table 17 shows the analysis of participant background on performance. None of the
background survey questions significantly influenced performance.
Table 17. Participant background influence on performance
Variable

F test

p value

Age

0.00

.9831

English

0.32

.5734

Gender

1.15

.2851

Probability skill

1.74

.1897

Probability experience

1.03

.3128

Degree attained

1.08

.3002

Degree in progress

0.58

.4468

Visual impairment

2.25

.1357
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APPENDIX G. TREATMENTS
PROBLEM 1. BLUE CAB
Prevalence: 15% (15/100)
Sensitivity: 80% (12/15)
Specificity: 80% (68/85)
H = Cab is Blue
D = Cab is seen as Blue

D
Not D

H
12
3
15

Not H
17
68
85

Not H = cab is Green
Not D = cab is seen as Green

29
71
100

Answer final: 12 / 29 = 41.379% * 20 = 8.2758 (8 or 9)
Answer intermediate: 29 / 100 = 29% * 50 = 14.5, (14 or 15)
Text RC6
T1: A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green and
the Blue, operate cabs in the city. On the night of the accident, a witness said the cab was
Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility conditions with
Blue and Green cabs by conducting 100 tests on the witness. When the cabs were really Blue,
the witness said they were Blue in 12 out of 15 tests. When the cabs were really Green, the
witness said they were Blue in 17 out of 85 tests. Overall, the witness identified 29 cabs as
Blue.
Question: If 20 accidents occurred over the next few months in which the witness said the cab
was Blue, how many accidents would a Blue cab actually be involved in?
Diagram RC6
T1: A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green and
the Blue, operate cabs in the city. On the night of the accident, a witness said the cab was
Blue.
T2: The court tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility conditions with
Blue and Green cabs by conducting 100 tests on the witness. The results are as follows:
Right circle label: Green cabs (85)
Left circle label: Blue cabs (15)
Ellipse: Cabs witness said were Blue (29)
Ellipse right: Green cabs witness said were blue (17)
Ellipse left: Blue cabs witness said were blue (12)
Question: If 20 accidents occurred over the next few months in which the witness said the cab
was Blue, how many accidents would a Blue cab actually be involved in?
Text RC3
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T1: A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green and
the Blue, operate cabs in the city. On the night of the accident, a witness said the cab was
Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility conditions with
Blue and Green cabs by conducting 100 tests on the witness. In 29 of those tests, the witness
said the cab was Blue.
Question A: If 50 accidents occurred over the next year, how many times would this witness
say the cab was Blue?
T2: In the tests in which the witness said the cab was Blue, the cab was actually Blue 12
times.
Question B: If 20 accidents occurred over the next few months in which the witness said the
cab was Blue, how many accidents would a Blue cab actually be involved in?
Diagram RC3
T1: A cab was involved in a hit-and-run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green and
the Blue, operate cabs in the city. On the night of the accident, a witness said the cab was
Blue.
T2: The court tested the reliability of the witness under the similar visibility conditions with
Blue and Green cabs by conducting 100 tests on the witness. The results are as follows:
Circle A: Cabs tested (100)
Circle B: Cabs witness said were Blue (29)
Question A: If 50 accidents occurred over the next year, how many times would this witness
say the cab was Blue?
Circle C: Cabs actually Blue (12)
Question B: If 20 accidents occurred over the next few months in which the witness said the
cab was Blue, how many accidents would a Blue cab actually be involved in?

PROBLEM 2. MAMMOGRAPHY
Prevalence: .8% (8/1000)
Sensitivity: 80% (8/10)
Specificity: 90.4% (895/990)
H = Has disease
D = Tested positive

D
Not D

H
8
2
10

Not H = does not have disease
Not D = Tested negative
Not H
95
895
990

103
897
1000

Answer final: 8 / 103 = 7.76% * 80 = 6.21 (6 or 7)
Answer intermediate: 103 / 1000 = 10.3% * 750 = 77.25 or 103 / 1000 = 10% * 750 (77 or
78, 75)
Text RC6:
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T1: A doctor runs a clinic specializing in breast cancer. Over the last four years, the doctor
has seen 1,000 women for routine screening. 103 out of those 1,000 women had tests results
showing cancer and 897 with test results indicating no cancer. Overall, 10 women actually
had the disease with 8 women who had test results showing cancer and 2 with test results
showing no cancer.
Question: Based on this data, if another 80 women had positive tests, how many would you
expect to have the disease?
Diagram RC6:
T1: A doctor runs a clinic specializing in breast cancer.
T2: Over the last four years, the doctor has seen many women for routine screening. The
results are as follows:
Right circle label: Women with tests results showing no cancer (897)
Left circle label: Women with tests results indicating cancer (103)
Ellipse: Women with the disease (10)
Ellipse right label: Women with positive tests who have the disease (8)
Ellipse left label: Women with negative tests who have the disease (2)
Question: Based on this data, if another 80 women had positive tests, how many can be
expected to have the disease?
Text RC3
T1: A doctor runs a clinic specializing in breast cancer. Over the last four years, the doctor
has seen 1,000 women for routine screening. 103 out of those 1,000 women had tests results
showing cancer.
Question A: Based on the data from this initial screening of women, if another 750 women
were screened, how many can be expected to have positive results?
T2: Of those who tested positive, 8 women actually had the disease.
Question B: Based on this data, if another 80 women had positive tests, how many can be
expected to have the disease?
Diagram RC3:
T1: A doctor runs a clinic specializing in breast cancer.
T2: Over the last four years, the doctor has seen many women for routine screening. The
results are as follows:
Circle A label: Women screened (1000)
Circle B label: Women with positive tests (103)
Question A: Based on the data from this initial screening of women, if another 750 women
were screened, how many can be expected to have positive results?
Circle C: Women with the disease (8)
Question B: Based on this data, if another 80 women had positive tests, how many can be
expected to have the disease?

PROBLEM 3. STUDENTS WITH GLASSES
Prevalence: 90% (90/100)
Sensitivity: 50% (45/90)
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Specificity: 70% (7/10)
H = Person is a student
D = Person wears glasses

D
Not D

H
45
45
90

Not H
3
7
10

Not H = Person is not a student
Not D = Person does not wear glasses

48
52
100

Answer final: 45 / 48 = 93.75% * 20 = 18.75 (18 or 19)
Answer A: 48 / 100 = 48% * 50 = 24.0
Text RC6:
T1: On a university campus are people who are students and non-students, some who wear
glasses and some who do not. 90 out of every 100 people you meet are students of this
university. Of the 90 students, 45 wear glasses. Of the remaining 10 people that are not
students, 3 also wear glasses. Overall, 48 people on campus wear glasses.
Question: Suppose you meet a group of 20 people who wear glasses on the campus. How
many of them would you expect to be students at this university?
Diagram RC6:
T1: On a university campus are people who are students and non-students, some who wear
glasses and some who do not.
T2: A recent count of a sample population is as follows:
Left circle label: University students (90)
Right circle label: Not university students (10)
Ellipse: People wearing glasses (48)
Ellipse left: Students wearing glasses (45)
Ellipse right: Non-students wearing glasses (3)
Question: Suppose you meet a group of 20 people who wear glasses on the campus. How
many of them would you expect to be students at this university?
Text RC3:
T1: On a university campus are people who are students and non-students, some who wear
glasses and some who do not. 48 out of every 100 people you meet wear glasses.
Question A: Suppose you were to meet 50 people on campus. How many of them would you
expect to be wearing glasses?
T2: Of those people on campus wearing glasses, 45 of them are students.
Question B: Suppose you were to meet a group of 20 people who wear glasses on campus.
How many of them would you expect to be students at this university?
Diagram RC3:
T1: On a university campus are people who are students and non-students, some who wear
glasses and some who do not.
T2: A recent count of a sample population is as follows:
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Circle A label: People on campus (100)
Circle B label: People wearing glasses (48)
Question A: Suppose you were to meet 50 people on campus. How many of them would you
expect to be wearing glasses?
Circle C label: Students wearing glasses (45)
Question B: Suppose you were to meet a group of 20 people who wear glasses on campus.
How many of them would you expect to be students at this university?

PROBLEM 4. WORKFORCE PLANNING
Prevalence: 70% (28/40)
Sensitivity: 14% (4/28)
Specificity: 33% (4/12)
H = Prefers downtown location
D = Prefers night shifts

D
Not D

H
4
24
28

Not H
8
4
12

Not H = Prefers suburban location
Not D = Prefers day shifts

12
28
40

Answer final: 4 / 12 = 33.33% * 75 = 25 (24)
Answer A: 12 / 40 = 30% * 200 = 60
Text RC6:
T1: A manufacturing company asked every person who was hired if they prefer to work
during the day or at night and if they prefer to work at the company’s downtown location in
the city’s center or if they prefer to work at the company’s suburban location. The company
found that out of 40 employees surveyed, 28 prefer working days and 12 preferred working
nights. A total of 29 preferred working downtown. Of those 29, 4 expressed an interest in
working nights at the downtown location and 24 expressed an interest in working days at the
downtown location.
Question: If the company hires another 75 employees who prefer working nights, how many
would you expect to prefer the downtown location?
Diagram RC6:
T1: A manufacturing company asked every person who was hired if they prefer to work
during the day or at night and if they prefer to work at the company’s downtown location in
the city’s center or if they preferred to work in the company’s suburban location.
T2: The results are as follows:
Left circle label: Prefers nights (12)
Right circle label: Prefers days (28)
Ellipse: Prefers downtown (29)
Ellipse left: Prefers downtown nights (4)
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Ellipse right: Prefers downtown days (24)
Question: If the company hires another 75 employees who prefer working nights, how many
would you expect to prefer the downtown location?
Text RC3:
T1: A manufacturing company asked every person who was hired if they prefer to work
during the day or at night and if they prefer to work at the company’s downtown location in
the city’s center or if they preferred to work in the company’s suburban location. The
company found that out of 40 employees surveyed, 12 preferred working nights.
Question A: If the company hires another 200 employees, how many would you expect to
prefer working nights?
T2: Of those surveyed who said they preferred working nights, 4 said they preferred working
nights downtown.
Question B: If the company hires another 75 employees who prefer working nights, how
many would you expect to prefer the downtown location?
Diagram RC3:
T1: A manufacturing company asked every person who was hired if they prefer to work
during the day or at night and if they prefer to work at the company’s downtown location in
the city’s center or if they preferred to work in the company’s suburban location.
T2: The results are as follows:
Circle A label: People asked (40)
Circle B label: Prefers nights (12)
Question A: If the company hires another 200 employees, how many would you expect to
prefer nights?
Circle C label: Prefers nights downtown (4)
Question B: If the company hires another 75 employees who prefer working nights, how
many would you expect to prefer the downtown location?

PROBLEM 5. COOKIES
Prevalence: 20% (10/50)
Sensitivity: 70% (7/10)
Specificity: 70% (28/40)
H = Cookie is salty
D = Cookie is round

D
Not D

H
7
3
10

Not H = cookie is sweet
Not D = Cookie is square
Not H
12
28
40

19
31
50

Answer final: 7 / 19 = 36.84% * 10 = 3.684 (3 or 4)
Answer A: 19 / 50 = 38% * 20 = 7.6 (7 or 8)
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Text RC6:
T1: There is a bag of 50 sweet or salty cookies with various kinds of shapes. In the bag, 10 of
the cookies are salty and 40 are sweet. A total of 19 cookies are round with 7 of the round
being salty cookies, and 12 of the round being sweet cookies.
Question: Imagine you taking 10 round cookies from the bag of 50. How many of them
would you expect to be salty?
Diagram RC6:
T1: There is a bag of sweet or salty cookies with various kinds of shapes.
T2: The contents of the bag are as follows:
Right circle label: Salty (10)
Left circle label: Sweet (40)
Ellipse: Round (19)
Ellipse right: Salty round (7)
Ellipse left: Sweet round (12)
Question: Imagine taking 10 round cookies from the bag of fifty. How many of them would
you expect to be salty?
Text RC3:
T1: There is a bag of 50 sweet or salty cookies with various kinds of shapes. Of the different
cookies in the bag, 19 are round.
Question A: Imagine taking out 20 cookies from the bag. How many would you expect to be
round?
T2: Of the round cookies in the bag, 7 cookies are salty.
Question B: Imaging taking 10 round cookies from the bag of fifty. How many would you
expect to be salty?
Diagram RC3:
T1: There is a bag of sweet or salty cookies with various kinds of shapes.
T2: The contents of the bag are as follows:
Circle A label: Cookies (50)
Circle B label: Round cookies (19)
Question A: Imagine taking out 20 cookies from the bag. How many would you expect to be
round?
Circle C label: Salty round cookies (7)
Question B: Imaging taking 10 round cookies from the bag of fifty. How many would you
expect to be salty?

PROBLEM 6. COLOR-BLIND MEN
Prevalence: 50% (500/1000)
Sensitivity: 5% (25/500)
Specificity: 99.6% (498/500)
H = Person is male
D = Person is color-blind

Not H = Person is female
Not D = Person is not color-blind
- 124 -

D
Not D

H
25
475
500

Not H
2
498
500

27
973
1000

Answer final: 25 / 27 = 92.592% * 10 = 9.259 (9 or 10)
Answer A: 27 / 1000 = 2.7% * 100 = 2.7 (2 or 3)
Text RC6:
T1: A small town has a population of 1,000 people (500 men and 500 women). A total of 27
people in the town are color-blind with 2 women who are color-blind and 25 men who are
color-blind.
Question: If you randomly selected 10 people from all the color blind people in this town,
how many would you expect to be men?
Diagram RC6:
T1: A small town has a population of both women and men, some of whom are color-blind.
T2: The population can be depicted as follows:
Right circle label: Men (500)
Left circle label: Women (500)
Ellipse: Color blind people (27)
Ellipse right: Color blind men (25)
Ellipse left: Color blind women (2)
Question: If you randomly selected 10 people from all the color-blind people in this town,
how many would you expect to be men?
Text RC3:
T1: A small town has a population of town of 1,000 people (500 men and 500 women). A
total of 27 people in the town are color blind.
Question A: If you randomly selected 100 people from this population, how many would you
expect to be color blind?
T2: Of the color-blind people in the town, 25 are men.
Question B: If you randomly selected 10 people from all the color blind people in this town,
how many would you expect to be men?
Diagram RC3:
T1: A small town has a population of both women and men, some of whom are color blind.
T2: The population can be depicted as follows:
Circle A label: Population of men and women (1000)
Circle B label: Color blind people (27)
Question A: If you randomly selected 100 people from this population, how many would you
expect to be color blind?
Circle C label: Color-blind men (25)
Question B: If you randomly selected 10 people from all the color blind people in this town,
how many would you expect to be men?
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PROBLEM 7. SPAM E-MAIL
Prevalence: 48% (24/50)
Sensitivity: 83% (20/24)
Specificity: 77% (20/26)
H = Email is spam
D = Email flagged as spam

D
Not D

H
20
4
24

Not H
6
20
26

Not H = Email is not spam
Not D = Email flagged as clean

26
24
50

Answer final: 20 / 26 = 76.92% * 200 = 153.84 = 154 or 153
Answer A: 26 / 50 = 52% * 1500 = 780
Text RC6:
T1: The ABC Technology Company has implemented spam filtering software. The company
did a test on 50 messages. The test results on 50 messages showed that the software flagged
26 messages as spam and 24 flagged as clean. After further investigation into the fifty
messages, the company found a total of 24 messages actually as spam, with 20 of those
messages as correctly flagged as spam and 4 that were incorrectly flagged as clean.
Question: If the software flagged 200 new emails as spam, how many of those email
messages would actually be spam?
Diagram RC6:
T1: The ABC Technology company has implemented spam filtering software.
T2: The company recently tested the software on some email with the following results:
Right circle label: Emails flagged as spam (26)
Left circle label: Email flagged as clean (24)
Ellipse: Email with spam (24)
Ellipse right: Emails flagged as spam actually spam (20)
Ellipse left: Emails flagged as clean actually spam (4)
Question: If the software flagged 200 new emails as spam, how many of those messages
would actually be spam?
Text RC3:
T1: The ABC Technology Company has implemented spam filtering software. The company
did a test on 50 messages. The test results on 50 messages showed that the software flagged
26 messages as spam.
Question A: If the software scanned another 1,500 messages, how many would be flagged as
spam?
T2: Of the emails flagged as spam, 20 were actually spam.
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Question B: If the software flagged 200 new emails as spam, how many of those messages
would actually be spam?
Diagram RC3:
T1: The ABC Technology company has implemented spam filtering software.
T2: The company recently tested the software on some email with the following results:
Circle A label: Tested messages (50)
Circle B label: Emails flagged as spam (26)
Question A: If the software scanned another 1,500 messages, how many would be flagged as
spam?
Circle C label: Emails flagged as spam actually spam (20)
Question B: If the software flagged 200 new emails as spam, how many of those messages
would actually be spam?

PROBLEM 8. ARSON TRIAL
Prevalence: 11% (108/1000)
Sensitivity: 78% (84/108)
Specificity: 96% (856/892)
H = Person is actually a match
Not H = Person is not a match
D = Test indicates person is a match Not D = Test indicates person is not a match

D
Not D

H
84
24
108

Not H
36
856
892

119
881
1000

Answer final: 84 / 119 = 70.588% * 7000 = 4940, 4,941, 4942, 4935, 4900
Answer A: 119 / 1000 = 11.9% * 20,000 = 2380 (2200)
Text RC6:
T1: During an arson trial, a pathologist testified that the fingerprints found on the bottle of
lighter fluid matched the suspect. But the pathologist testified that the particular test used to
determine a match is not 100% accurate. If a sample of 1,000 residents were tested, 119
would have tests indicating they were a fingerprint match and 881 would have tests indicating
no fingerprint match. However, because of test inaccuracy, the test would work correctly for
only 84 of those 119 residents and would fail for 36 of those 119 residents. Overall, 120
residents would actually be a match.
Question: If you assume that 7,000 people have tests indicating a match, how many would
you expect to be actually a match?
Diagram RC6:
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T1: During an arson trial, a pathologist testified that the fingerprints found on the bottle of
lighter fluid matched the suspect. But the pathologist testified that the particular test used to
determine a match is not 100% accurate.
T2: The accuracy of the test on a sample of people is as follows:
Right circle label: People with tests indicating a match (119)
Left circle label: People with tests indicating no match (881)
Ellipse: People actually a match (120)
Ellipse right: People with tests indicating a match who actually are a match (84)
Ellipse left: People with tests indicating no match who actually are a match (36)
Question: If you assume 7,000 people have tests indicating a match, how many would you
expect to be actually a match?
Text RC3:
T1: During an arson trial, a pathologist testified that the fingerprints found on the bottle of
lighter fluid matched the suspect. But the pathologist testified that the particular test used to
determine a match is not 100% accurate. If a sample of 1,000 residents were tested, 119
would have tests indicating they were a fingerprint match.
Question A: Based on this data, if a sample of 20,000 residents, how many do you expect will
have a test indicating a match?
T2: Of those with tests indicating they were a fingerprint match, 84 people were later shown
to be actually a match.
Question B: If you assume 7,000 people have tests indicating a match, how many would you
expect to be actually a match?
Diagram RC3:
T1: During an arson trial, a pathologist testified that the fingerprints found on the bottle of
lighter fluid matched the suspect. But the pathologist testified that the particular test used to
determine a match is not 100% accurate.
T2: The accuracy of the test on a sample of people is as follows:
Circle A label: People tested (1000)
Circle B label: People with tests indicating a match (119)
Question A: Based on this data, in a sample of 20,000 residents, how many do you expect
will have a test indicating a match?
Circle C label: People actually a match (84)
Question B: If you assume 7,000 people have tests indicating a match, how many would you
expect to be actually a match?

PROBLEM 9. COMPROMISED PCS
Prevalence: 4% (15/400)
Sensitivity: 93% (14/15)
Specificity: 89% (343/385)
H = PC has been compromised
D = PC has possible vulnerability

Not H = PC has not been compromised
Not D = Does not have a vulnerability
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D
Not D

H
14
1
15

Not H
42
343
385

56
344
400

Answer final: 14 / 56 = 25% * 150 = 37.5 (37 or 38)
Answer A: 56 / 400 = 14% * 1200 = 168
Text RC6:
T1: A medium sized firm scanned a sample of its PCs and found some of its computers had
vulnerabilities that might let hackers control the PCs. The scan also showed that some of its
computers were already taken over by hackers. In this test, the security team scanned a
sample of 400 PCs and found that 56 PCs out of the 400 were showing a vulnerability and
344 were not showing a vulnerability. Upon further examination by the security team, only 15
PCs were hacked into, with 14 that were hacked into as showing a vulnerability and 1 that
was not showing a vulnerability.
Question: Based on this data, if the security team had another 150 PCs showing a
vulnerability, how many would have been hacked into?
Diagram RC6:
T1: A medium-sized firm scanned a sample of its PCs and found some of its computers had
vulnerabilities that might let hackers control the PC.
T2. The scan also showed that and some of its computers were already taken over by hackers.
The details of the scan are as follows:
Right circle label: PCs showing a vulnerability (56)
Left circle label: PCs not showing a vulnerability (344)
Ellipse: PCs hacked into (15)
Ellipse right: PCs showing a vulnerability hacked into (14)
Ellipse left: PCs not showing a vulnerability hacked into (1)
Question: Based on this data, if the security team had another 150 PCs showing a
vulnerability, how many would be hacked into?
Text RC3:
T1: A medium sized firm scanned a sample of its PCs and found some of its computers had
vulnerabilities that might let hackers control the PCs. The scan also showed that some of its
computers were already taken over by hackers. In this test, the security team scanned a
sample of 400 PCs and found that 56 PCs were showing a vulnerability.
Question A: If the security team scanned another 1,200 PCs, how many would show a
vulnerability?
T2. Of the PCs showing a vulnerability, 14 were hacked into.
Question B: If the security team had another 150 PCs showing a vulnerability, how many
would be hacked into?
Diagram RC3:
T1: A medium-sized firm scanned a sample of its PCs and found some of its computers had
vulnerabilities that might let hackers control the PC.
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T2. The scan also showed that and some of its computers that were already taken over by
hackers. The details of the scan are as follows:
Circle A label: PCs scanned (400)
Circle B label: PCs showing a vulnerability (56)
Question A: If the security team scanned another 1,200 PCs, how many would show a
vulnerability?
Circle C label: PCs showing a vulnerability that were hacked into (14)
Question B: If the security team had another 150 PCs showing a vulnerability, how many
would be hacked into?

PROBLEM 10. MARKETING STUDY
Prevalence: 60% (120/200)
Sensitivity: 40% (48/120)
Specificity: 68% (54/80)
H = Customer bought
D = Customer was thought likely to buy

D
Not D

H
48
72
120

Not H
26
54
80

Not H = Customer did not buy
Not D = Customer was thought unlikely to buy

74
126
200

Answer: 48 / 74 = 64.864% * 10,000= 6,486.4 (6,486 or 6,487 or 6480, or 6400, or 6500)
Answer A: 74 / 200 = 37% * 50,000 = 18,500
Text RC6:
T1: A company did a study of its customers to predict who would be likely to buy the
company’s new product. As part of the study, the company sent an offer to buy the new
product to 200 of its customers. The study identified 74 of the 200 customers as likely to buy
the new product and 126 not likely to buy the new product. Of the 200 customers, a total of
120 customers bought the new product. Of those 120 customers who bought, 48 customers
were identified as likely to buy, and 72 were identified as not likely to buy.
Question: If the company were to send the offer to buy the new product to another list of
10,000 customers who were identified as likely to buy the new product, how many would you
expect to actually buy the new product?
Diagram RC6:
T1: A company did a study of some of its customers to predict who would be likely to buy the
company’s new product. As part of the study, the company sent an offer to buy the new
product to some of its customers.
T2. The results of the mailing of the offer showed the following results:
Right circle label: Customers not likely to buy the new product (126)
Left circle label: Customers likely to buy the new product (74)
Ellipse: Customers who bought the new product (120)
Ellipse right: Customers not likely to buy who bought the new product (72)
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Ellipse left: Customers likely to buy who bought the new product (48)
Question: If the company were to send an offer to a new list of 10,000 customers who were
already identified as likely to buy, how many would you expect to actually buy the new
product?
Text RC3:
T1: A company did a study of its customers to predict who would be likely to buy the
company’s new product. As part of the study, the company sent an offer to buy the new
product to 200 of its customers. The study identified 74 of the 200 customers as likely to buy
the new product.
Question A: If the company were to send an offer to buy the new product to a new list of
50,000 potential customers, how many would be likely to buy the new product?
T2: Of the customers who would be likely to buy, 48 bought the new product.
Question B: If the company were to send an offer to a new list of 10,000 customers who were
already identified as likely to buy, how many would you expect to actually buy the new
product?
Diagram RC3:
T1: A company did a study of some of its customers to predict who would be likely to buy the
company’s new product. As part of the study, the company sent an offer to buy the new
product to some of its customers.
T2. The results of the mailing of the offer showed the following results:
Circle A label: Customers tested (200)
Circle B label: Customers likely to buy (74)
Question A: If the company were to send an offer to buy the new product to a new list of
50,000 potential customers, how many would be likely to buy the new product?
Circle C label: Customers likely to buy who bought (48)
Question B: If the company were to send an offer to a new list of 10,000 customers who were
already identified as likely to buy, how many would you expect to actually buy the new
product?
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